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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

The Uruguay Round (UR)

1

revised the Agreement on

Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT),

introduced in the Tokyo Round.

3

2

which was first

The revised TBT has been

applied to the GATT member countries since 1995. Article
2.2 of the TBT provides national product safety agencies

with requirements for risk assessment and risk management. 4
The terms used in the Article are broad and can have

various interpretations: minimum requirements, common

denominators of GATT member countries' practices for risk
assessment and risk management. The Article also allows

The UR (1986-1994) had discussed especially such topics as
dispute settlement procedure and principles, agriculture,
intellectual properties, services, and so on. See Jonn H. Jackson,
Legal Problems of International Problems of International
Relations, at pp. 302-304 (forthcoming 1995) [hereinafter,
Jackson]
on the text of agreements resulting from UR, see GATT,
The Results of the Urguay Round of Multinational Trade Negotiation
1

.

;

(1994)
2
The UR also introduced the Agreement on the Application of
which regulates the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (ASPM)
sanitary and phytosanitary aspect of all kinds of food. ASPM is
the special agreement to the TBT.
3
The Tokyo Round (1973-79) was held in order to handle nontarriff barriers such as subsidies, dumpings, and the like; TBT
was born as one of the agreements in this line. Id. at pp. 3 04.

,

.

305.
In ASPM, Article 5. Setting safety regulations and
standards is a dominant measure among risk management strategies.
4

.

.

2

vast discretion for national practices in order to make

room for the differences in national practices.
However, vast discretion and broad terms cannot solve

technical barriers effectively. 5 The minimum requirements
have already been criticized for failing to consider those

countries whose technology in product safety is inferior to
that of developed countries. Moreover,

the minimum

requirements can raise trade barriers in international
trade between developing countries and developed countries

Developed countries can protect their industries from
products competitive in price through technologically
strict standards; developing countries can require the

companies of the developed countries to reveal state-of-the
-art technology,

the pivot of their international

competition. Therefore, the TBT should contain detailed

provisions in order to solve this problem.
The United States is one of the developed countries

with the strongest product safety measures, thanks to the
consumer protection movement and advanced technology. The
US has its own system of risk assessment and risk

management for product safety. Since these are activities
of a sovereign nation,

they will not violate Article

2

.

2

of

TBT unless these regulations and standards are more trade-

restrictive than necessary to achieve safety legitimacy.
Some practices of the US product safety agencies have been

fi

.

On technical barriers,

see infra at pp. 57-61.

3

criticized because they consider not internationally
accepted practices but their own industrial practices.
Moreover,

some of their methods in risk assessment and risk

management are under attack for violating Article
the TBT.

2

.

2

of

If the interpretation of the Article finds the US

practices in violation of the TBT, the US must change its
practices in accordance with the Article. In addition, when
the TBT adds detailed provisions,

as

I

suggest that it

should, US practices should also make deep and broad

changes to comply with the new provisions.
This thesis will discuss the current problems of the

TBT and of US practices and suggest changes. For these
purposes,

I

will first discuss general theories on the

reasons why each country has different practices and
standards,

the types of product safety regulations, and the

characteristics of product safety regulations and
standards. Then, an analysis of the US practices and

Article 2.2 of the TBT will follow. Finally,

possible

changes will be suggested in order to address the problems.

.

.

CHAPTER II
RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT

A. Risk in Product Safety

A risk is "a notion of observation, and not just an
object to be observed." 6 It can be compared to "a kind of
lens through which we see the world." 7

Depending on notions

and methods of observation, the definition of a risk can
change. In one of the definitions, a risk means "potential

adverse events," 8 while safety means "freedom from danger,
injury or damage." 9 A risk in product safety, therefore, can
be defined as potential adverse events such as danger,

injury or damage from the use and storage of products. 10 A

Franz Holzheu and Peter M. Wiedermann, Introduction:
Perspectives on Risk Perception in Bayerishe Ruck ed. Risk is a
Construct, at pp. 9-10 (1993)
6

.

7

Id.

.

A risk can have three different definitions. It generally
means "potential events whose concrete manifestation cannot be
foreseen with any certainty," but narrowly means "potential
adverse events" as seen above. Even more generally, it means
"unspecified aberrations from a normal or average trend whether
... in the adverse direction or in both directions including
Id. at 9.
favorable departures from a norm as well."
9
David B. Guralnik, Webster' s New World Dictionary 2nd Ed.
8

.

.

(1980)

.

10
This thesis will only deal with human injury. The
definition of an injury is a level of harm or concern about harm,
sufficient to result in activity cutdown for one day or more or
medical examination with or without activity cutdown. Irving
Scher, Consumer Product Safety Act, at p. 112 and 116
(1973) [hereinafter, Scher 1973]
.

5

risk is a potential ^vent which is described in terms of

probability in comparison with other risks. 11

B.

Risk Assessment and Risk Management

1.

Facts and Values

Risk assessment is the process of determining the

probability and severity of an accident or a disease. It
considers facts, and its outcome is stated mostly in

statistics or comparison statements,

12

based on empirical or

scientific analysis. 13 The assessment may be based on an

assumption as well as facts. 14
Risk management, on the other hand, means control over
It deals with social values 15 and

the identified risks.

seeks to evaluate selected measures, alternatives, effects
on society,

11
.

12
.

costs and benefits and so on.

Holzheu and Wiedermann, at p 10.
Lewis Bass, Product Liability: Design and Manufacturing
.

Defects, at p. 415 (1986)
13
OECD Committee on Consumer Policy, Consumer Product
Safety Standards and International Trade, at p. 19 (1991)
[hereinafter, OECD 1991]
14
Even though risk assessment deals with facts, the
assumption based on these facts also needs value judgment.
15
Kathryn Harrison and George Hoberg, Risk, Science and
Politics, at p. 7 (1994)
.

.

.

.

.

.

2.

Characteristics

a.

Risk Assessment: Technical and Scientific Uncertainty

Safety agencies have a tough task of determining
regulations based on uncertain data, which stems from the
attributes of science and technology. Data for risk

assessment always include technical and scientific facts
and assumptions such as ceteris paribus

16
.

Since variable

factors can change the conclusion based on an assumption,

risk assessment and risk management decisions are based on
a high level of uncertainty. Health and safety agencies

must make value judgements regarding the probability of

harm and the degree of acceptable risk despite this
uncertainty. 17

b.

Risk Management: Value Judgement

The safety regulation on product safety is one of the
social regulations that focus on social values. Safety is
one of the social values,- 18 risks are the opposite side of
16
.

It

means "all else remaining the same." See Guralnik, p.

234.
17
Harrison and Hoberg, at p. 5; refer to organization
theory and sociology.
18
The regulations can be classified into economic
regulations and social regulations based on the difference of the
weight between values and information. Social regulations concern
the living quality of national people, examples of which are the
protection of consumers of products and environmental health and
safety. See Peter K. Manning, The Limits of Knowledge The Role of
.

.

:

.

.

.

.

7

safety. The areas of risks are still too new to form a

reliable and coherent model for value judgments in making

regulations and standards. 19 The terms in product safety

provisions are usually so ambiguous and symbolic that their

operation is often challenged surrounding the

interpretation

3

.

20

Risk Assessment and Risk Management in the Process of

Making Product Safety Regulations and Standards

The process of making product safety regulations and

standards comprises five stages: hazard identification,
risk characterization, the survey of overall measures and

their data, the decision of a measure and its details, and

implementation and feedback. 21 Risk assessment and risk
management cover the entire process of making safety
regulations or standards.
For example,

suppose the risk assessment and the risk

management of carcinogens in a consumer product. Risk
assessment involves the first stages. The first stage is

hazard identification. Safety agencies try to find out

Information in Regulation in Keith Hawkins and John M. Thomas ed
Making Regulatory Policy, at p. 49 and 51 (1989) [hereinafter,
Manning]
W. Curtiss Priest, Risks, Concerns and Social
Legislation, at p. 167 (1988) [hereinafter, Priest]
20
Keith Hawkins and John M. Thomas, Making Regulatory
Policy, at p. 15 (1989)
19

.

.

21
.

Id.

at pp. 6-7.

8

whether or not a certain substance causes cancer, the
hazard assessed from the number of incidents, severities of
injuries and so on. This information molds the assumption
that a certain product is dangerous to humans. However,

this identification process remains at a preliminary level.

Based on this preliminary assumption, the source and the

probability of potential harm will be assessed on the basis
of collected data as the risk characterization.

The second stage is risk characterization. Here, the

severity and the probability of cancer are estimated, based
on the carcinogenic potency of substances in the product as

well as the extent and the nature of human exposure to it.
At this stage,

a

preliminary decision is made regarding the

necessity for and priority of safety measures.
Risk management consists of three stages. In the first
stage,

a survey of overall

measures is made. The safety

agencies identify and compare as many safety measures and

alternatives as possible. Basic information is gathered on
cost,

technical feasibility, impact on the society, and the

possibility of alternative measures. The next stage is
selecting a safety measure and determining its details.
Here,

an acceptable level of risk and the measures to

achieve the best result are chosen. Such decisions are
founded on the information from the preceding stages

.

The

choice can be made based on intuition, political motives
and existing formal criteria such as cost-benefit analysis

.

9

of the safety agencies,

or the policy and philosophy of

certain influential participants. The final stage is

implementation and feedback. The chosen strategy is
reviewed and adjustments are made. This process helps
safety agencies assess correctly the efficiency of the

chosen measures and shift quickly to another strategy if
the results are not satisfactory.

C.

Factors that Cause Different Practices among Countries

1.

Examples of Differences

The practices of risk assessment and risk management

vary among countries and depend on how people in different
areas perceive risks: the greater the fear of risks in an
the stricter the safety requirements. For example,

area,

the safety regulations of the US National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA) have a notorious reputation
among developed countries in that the conformity with these

regulations requires technical enhancement. 22 Japan has more
fear about risks in food than any other country. 23 The US is
one of the countries which have the greatest fear about

technological products with unknown hazards. 24 These are

OECD 1991, at p. 27; on the reasons for the notorious
reputation, see infra, Chapter V, B, 1 and 2.
23
Aaron Wildavsky, Comparative Study of Risk Perception in
Bayerishe Ruck ed. Risk is a Construct, at p. 185 (1993)
22

.

.

24
.

Id.

at p.

190.

10

some examples of how different notions about risks result
in different risk assessment and risk management practices.

The quantitative differences in risk assessment and

risk management can be shown by the relative degree of

acceptability or appropriateness. For example, suppose
Country A determines product X hazardous if it causes more
than one casualty out of 100 consumers, whereas Country B

considers X hazardous if it causes one casualty out of 1000
customers. If no trade in product X exists between those
two countries,

there will be no dispute over product safety

measures because the decision of acceptable risk is a right
of national sovereignty. However,

the reality is that

countries do trade with each other.

2

.

Basic Principles

Though different countries take different approaches
to risk assessment and risk management,

they operate under

common principles. The first two principles stem from the
free market system,

the first being that a zero risk of

products is not only almost impossible but also
inefficient,

the second,

that different consumers and

25
societies evaluate the safety of a product differently.

25

W.

.

2

(1984)

.

Kip Viscusi, Regulating Consumer Product Safety, at

p.

11

Third,

risk management aimed toward manufacturers

prevails over risk management toward consumers. The safetyagencies survey consumer behaviors and their influence on
the agencies' total safety regulation scheme. 26

Theoretically, they should take account of reasonably

foreseeable consumer behaviors and set the safety program
to change. However,

in real practice safety regulations

usually concentrate on trying to change manufacturers
rather than consumers just because changing manufacturers'

practices is easier than changing consumers' behaviors. 27
Without any efforts to correct consumer behaviors, it is
doubtful that safety regulations will achieve the objective
of consumer safety.

For example, despite the introduction

of a certain type of car seat belt,

the accident rate might

not be reduced.

The fourth principle is that risk assessment and

management are a matter of degree and attitude. As

discussed earlier,

"different kinds of lens" determine

things to be seen. 28 The lens is the society, time, and the
situation. For instance, the degree of risks in nuclear

power plant safety or traffic safety, is different

depending on the societies.

26
.

Id.

.

Id.

27
28
.

at p.
at p.

19.

20.

Holzheu and Wiedemann, at pp. 9-10.

.

.

12
3

.

a.

Factors in Risk Assessment

Hegemony between Experts and Lay people

The hegemony within safety agencies between experts
and lay people may influence product safety regulations and

standards since lay people and experts view risk assessment
differently. 29 Experts regard probability and uncertainty as

very important elements. 30 They try to exploit all the
available data and perform fault -free analyses, prefer

mathematical calculations and consider uncertainty with a
high degree of exactness when calculating the probability
of occurrences. 31 They try to be free of the emotional

element in their jobs. These experts tend to underestimate
the risks of low- consequence but high-probability events. 32

On the contrary, lay people tend to overestimate the
risks of high- consequence but low-probability events. Lay

people base their risk perception on fear, familiarity, and
the number of people exposed to the risks. 33 They are not

familiar with the experts' methods for dealing with

probability and uncertainty. Therefore, depending on

29
.

Lay people are people other than experts who specialize

in scientific or technological knowledge in a relevant area.
30
Peter M. Wiedemann, Taboo, Sin, Risk: Changes in the
Social Perception of Hazards in Bayerishe Ruck ed. Risk is a
Construct, at p. 51 (1993)
31
Ray Kemp, Risk Perception in Bayerishe Ruck ed. Risk is a
Construct, at pp. 105-106 (1993)
32
Id. at p. 106.
.

.

.

33
.

Id.

at pp.

106-107.

13

relative power of experts and lay people within the safety
agencies,

the outcome of risk management will differ.

b. Methodology of Experts in Risk Assessment

The result of risk assessment in the process of making

product safety regulations and standards may depend on

which method is adopted among experts' methods. Moreover,
the degree of reliance on experts' reports can make safety

agencies' risk management different.

During the preliminary stage of hazard identification,
experts use more varied and specific methods of risk

assessment than do lay people. The lab test is one of them.
Products which "go into human" almost always go through lab
tests performed by toxicologists, food scientists, or

biochemists. 34 The toxic substance test, the bio-

organization test, and the like are conducted on animals
such as mice and rats. These tests may reveal such

information as the exact amount of a substance, the
tolerance of the human body, or the threshold of a disease.
Experts may take one of two approaches. In a

qualitative approach, research is focused on at how much
amount of intake a substance crosses the threshold to
unsafety. In a quantitative approach, any toxic substance

3
On the meaning of products which go into human, see infra
Chapter III, A, 1.
"

.

14

is considered dangerous regardless of its amount. The

greater the consumption, the more dangerous it is

proclaimed to be to humans

In some countries where

.

scientific technology can calculate the effect of a minute
amount of a toxic substance, safety agencies have chosen
the quantitative assessment approach as their primary

method. When this quantitative approach is combined with
the theory of probability,

the risk assessment process may

reveal the statistical chances of individuals' contracting
a

disease in proportion to the increasing consumption of

the substance. 35

The lab tests have limitations. Thirty-four substances
out of thirty- five extrinsic substances known to cause

cancer in people generate the same results in animals, but
the site of the cancer can be different. Moreover,

the

extrapolation of animal tests to humans is still a
controversial issue because a substance which does not
cause cancer in animals can,
humans,

in rare cases,

cause cancer in

as in the case of the Thalidomide disaster. 36 Some

also criticized that the heavy-dose tests on a small number
of animals may undermine the credibility of animal tests

when the test results are extrapolated to humans.

Harrison and Hoberg, at p. 5.
New York University Medical Center, Staying Healthy in a
Risky Environment, at p. 231 (1993); Linda Cummings, The Political
Reality of Artificial Sweeteners in Harvey M. Sapolsky ed.
Consuming Fear, at p 121 (19 86)
35

.

36

.

.

15

Another method is the epidemiological study, in which
the responses of the real population are researched on the

products

.

This requires a great deal of data gathered from

a large number of people over a long time.

The problem here

is that all the possible variables cannot be considered and

that the results may vary depending on the individuals. 37

c.

The Progress of Science and Technology

Scientific and technological development may affect

consumer attitudes toward the notion of safety. One of
these changes is the reduction of a fatalistic attitude

toward risks. 38 This change becomes complicated when

combined with other changes: the increased feeling of

insecurity which results from increased reliance on other
people; 39 reduction of direct experience; 40 a less

predictable future; bulky mass media information; the

37

Cummings, at p 121.
A concrete example is the way perceptions regarding
bearing children and delivery have changed. We can see how fast
mothers' views on the death or disability of a newborn have
changed into suspecting medical or scientific incompetence from
the earlier fatalistic viewpoint. See, Liibbe at pp. 26-28.
39
Modernization means more reliance on other's action and
warranty. This reliance means a situation seems out of one's own
control. The risk perceived of public transportation, for example,
is higher than that of one's own transportation. See, id. at pp.
28-30.
40
As basic knowledge of technical and scientific matters
has become more difficult for a lay person, the experience of
specialists or experts has started filling the gap. However, as in
hearings on certain regulations, these specialists sometimes have
opinions divided enough to disturb lay people's confidence. See,
id. at pp. 30-32
.

.

38

.

.

.

.

.

.
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decline of social control, and a high anticipation of

technological social security. 41 In addition, uneven
scientific development among different countries produces

different practices of risk assessment and risk

management

42

Progress in science and technology produces a feeling
of uncertainty about the future more frequently now than

ever. This uncertainty has led safety agencies to make

stricter regulations. For example, as detection methods for
food safety have improved, certain foods or food additives
that have long been regarded as relatively safe are being

challenged as unsafe. The more revelations are made, the
more people feel unsafe. 43
This technological and scientific uncertainty also
causes regulatory uncertainty in companies. 44 For example,
the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)

industries to use a

f lame -ret ardant

required

textile, Tris

.

However,

when it was discovered to contain a carcinogen, it was
banned. The companies that invested to comply with the CPSC

requirement incurred massive losses.

For example, the expectations for newly developed
medicine have increased. See id. at pp. 36-37.
42
Hermann Liibbe, Security, Risk Perception in the
Civilization Process in Bayerishe Ruck ed. Risk is a Construct, at
41

.

.

p.

26

(1993)

Cummings, at p. 119; this panic culminated in the zero
risk policy on the carcinogenicity of food additives in FDCA's
Delaney Amendment.
44
Viscusi, at p. 68.
43

.

.
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4.

Factors in Risk Management

a.

Different Cultures

The product safety agencies in different countries

respond differently to the same risk assessment results.
One of the reasons is that their national cultures

influence their responses. 45
In anthropology societies can be classified into

hierarchical cultures, egalitarian cultures,

individualistic cultures, and fatalistic cultures. 46 Risk

management is different in each culture. A hierarchial
culture follows the rejection or absorption of risks by its

decision makers,- an egalitarian culture rejects or deflects
risks without harming the principle of equality; an

individualistic culture accepts or deflects risks in
accordance with the consensus among individuals; and a
fatalistic culture accepts and absorbs risks without any
reservation. Though these cultures can coexist within a
country,

the most prevalent culture will represent the

culture of the country when defining the characteristic of
a country.

Harry Otway and Malcolm Peltu, Regulating Industrial
Risks, at p. 4 (1985)
46
On details, see Wildvsky, at pp. 185-187.
45

.

.

.
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b. Lay People and Experts

A different level of acceptable risk depends on
whether lay people or the experts are dominant in the

decision making process within safety agencies. According
to Juregan Habermas,

experts are theoretical and empirical,

while lay people are practical and norms or valueoriented.

47

Lay people try to find tolerable risks and focus

on evaluation, while experts try to find quantifiable risks

and statements of facts. Lay people regard appropriateness
as the standard of judgment,

whereas truth is the scale for

the experts. The lay people in an agency try to justify the

motives behind safety, while the experts try to explain the
causes of accidents or phenomena.

c.

Risk Communication

Risk communication refers to activities among safety
agencies,

industries, and citizens through the media

concerning risks. In a democratic country, it aims to help
the participants in risk assessment and risk management to
48
make rational decisions based on unrestricted information.

The extent and frequency of risk communication

determine what is feared and how much it is feared, and

47

Kemp, at p. 115.
G. Tyler Miller, Living in the Environment: Principles,
Connections, and Solution, at pp. 544-549 (1994)
.

48

.

.

,

19

this varies among the countries. 49 For example,

the

countries of former Eastern Europe were ignorant of the
risks of new substances made by new technology, because

they restricted risk communication believing that technical

progress equaled social progress. 50 Distortion of the risk

communication process induces false information or no
information, while a guarantee of participation and

discussion as well as availability of the mass media
enhances risk management. 51

d.

Attitude toward Science

The attitude toward science is also very important.
The degree of acceptability of scientific evidence and its
role were disputed in the ban case on the use of hormonal

substances in livestocks in 1987. The European Community
(EC)

Directive on this measure was to go into effect

beginning January

1

of 1988. The US argued that hormones at

a certain level were safe according to their scientific

evidence and that the EC's regulations were not necessary.
The EC contested the Production and Process Methods (PPMs)

expressing doubt about the scientific findings because they
found miscalculations of certain chemical products. In the

On an example, see Wildavsky, at p. 190.
Gerhard Hummius and Jens Kliemt, Risk as a Social
Construction in Bayerishe Ruck ed. Risk is a Construct, at p. 222
49

.

50

.

(1993)

.

51
.

Kemp,

at pp.

114-116.

.

20

dispute resolution procedure, the US insisted on the

establishment of an expert group, whereas the EC insisted
on setting up a panel without the expert group. This case

shows the differences between two parties on the role of

science and technology and expert assistance in dispute

settlement procedures. 52

e.

Participation

Participation by consumers, companies or foreign
companies with less developed technology changes the
results of the standards and regulations. For example,

restricting participation to industry members that have
already attained a certain level of technology allows those

members to be able to discourage other lower-price
competetors

.

They may try to avert the new technology of

foreign companies. 53 Those members may ask safety agencies
or private standard makers to reflect only their own

manufacturing practices and technical feasibility. This
situation happens when safety agencies rely solely on the
expert knowledge of manufacturers.

54

GATT, GATT Activities 1987, at p. 80 (1988) [hereinafter,
On the international dispute on the safety measure,
GATT 1987]
see id. at p. 100.
53
Franz Holzheu, Institutionalized Risk Perception in
Bayerishe Ruck ed. Risk is a Construct, at pp. 262-263 (1993).
54
In reality, limited participation is prevalent in some
countries or safety agencies
52

.

.

.

.

21

Consumer participation in risk management has a very
important meaning in that it can check the industry's

intention to drive out competitors who offer overall good

quality at a reasonable price. Theoretically, consumers'
taste worldwide is becoming more homogenous as product

information flows quickly throughout the world. 55 Consumer
participation, therefore, may reflect an international view
on the quality of products. However, the degree and effect
of participation is different among the countries.

56

Moreover, unless foreign companies are allowed to

participate in the entire process of making safety
regulations and standards, the standards or regulations
will inevitably reflect the national culture and

practices

57
.

D.

Styles of Risk Management

1.

Focus on Consensus

As discussed above,

the styles of risk assessment and

risk management among countries vary depending on many
factors. First,

the adversary structure universal in

Michael R. Czinkota and Ilkka A. Ronkainen, International
Marketing, at p. 269-273 (1995)
56
See Chapter III, A, 3, b.
57
Hans van Houtte, Health and Safety Regulations in
International Trade in Peter Sarcevic and Hans van Houtte ed.
Legal Issues in International Law, at p. 128 (1990), note 2.
55

.

.

.

.
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typical democratic countries such as the US, is

characterized by free information, free lobbying, and

multi-polar authority. Its regulatory process is
essentially adversarial among influential participants. 58
Under the adversarial system, the method of how and in
favor of which participant decision makers interpret the

external limits influences both the efficiency and the

equity of the risk management. The second style, called the
consensual structure, can be seen in the UK or the

Scandinavian countries. It has such characteristics as
deference to decisions made by elite groups which include
experts,

the industries and the unions.

The third style is the authoritative style, as in the

French system. It encourages the autonomy of the

technicians of the central government. Another structure is
the corporate style,

as in Germany. This style is less

democratic than the adversary structure but decentralizes
the government authorities into many participants. However,
to assure coherence of policies,

it has a multi-layer

surveillance program and various participation programs. 59
The above four styles are prototypes

.

The

characteristics of these structures may be combined in
various ways. The US has a more typically adversary
structure than any other country. It pays more attention to

58
.

59
.

Hawkins and Thomas, at p
Otway and Peltu, at p. 5.

.

4

.

.
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due process, one of the democratic principles,

to solve

adversarial clashes among participants

2.

Focus on Decision Makers

There are four types of decision makers in risk
management, according to the OECD report. The first is the

vertical model, where the central government has safety

regulation authority and disperses it through the regional
or branch governments by means of a command.

It is

generally common in the developing countries. The second
one is the centralized model,

in which, despite the

existence of private standard makers, the regulatory
activities are entirely dependent on governmental control
and a relation between two sectors exists. Germany, Japan,
and France follow this model

.

The third model is the

decentralized model. Here, governmental influence is
significantly diminished. Many private standard makers are
organized and actively participate in the regulatory
process

.

Canada and some parts of the US have this model

The fourth one is the horizontal standardization model that
can be seen in the US. In this model regulatory authority
is dispersed throughout influential groups and other

decision makers. This is such a democratic process that

24

cooperation among the participants and the standard makers
is weaker than in the third model.

3

.

60

Focus on Relation between Standards and Regulations

The relations between standards and regulations can be

classified into four types. The first type is the
establishment of safety specifications through regulation
by the safety agencies. 61 The safety agencies incorporate
already existent voluntary safety standards into mandatary
standards in regulations or develop specific mandatory
safety standards in regulations for themselves. 62 The

Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)

,

for example,

sometimes incorporated certain privately developed

standards into regulations after amendment of the Consumer
Product Safety Act (CPSA)

in 1980.

The second type is the establishment of standards by

independent standardization bodies, private or governmental
entities. There is no legal relation between those entities
and safety agencies. However, mandatory standards created

by safety agencies occasionally refer to specific safety

standards of these bodies. The Deutsches Institut fur

Normung (DIN) in Germany and the American National

OECD 1991, at pp. 24-25.
Hereinafter, the safety specification means the mandatory
safety standards within regulations.
62
OECD 1991, at pp. 25-27.
60

.

61

.

.

.
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Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Society of

Testing and Materials (ASTM) in the US are examples of
these independent standardization entities.

The third type makes reference to standards in

regulations. This style is prevalent in the United Kingdom,
Germany, and France. There is an agreement on the reference

between the safety agencies and the private standard
makers. The safety agencies prescribe as general provisions
as possible,

and they support and finance activities by the

private standard makers

.

The standards are then mandatorily

enforced. This can also be seen in the US system. 63

The fourth is the voluntary approach, which

concentrates on private standard makers' self -regulation.

Regulators and standard makers are separated and are
independent from each other. There is no relation with
safety agencies, no reference to standards by regulations
and no monitoring system. This is true,

for example,

in

Sweden and Australia. 64
The US originally used a mixture of the first type,
the second type and third types. After the product safety

agencies' vigorous attempts to use the first type were

frustrated, the second and the third types are now

prevalent

".
64

65

Id.

at pp. 31-32.
at p. 33.

.

Id.

.

See infra Chapter III,

B,

2.

CHAPTER III
US PRACTICES ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT FOR

PRODUCT SAFETY

A.

Practices in Safety Regulations on Products

1.

From FDCA to CPSA

The US history of safety regulations on consumer

products may be divided into the three stages: food and
drug legislation (1906-1953)

;

legislation directed at

specific hazards (1953-1972)

;

and the birth of

comprehensive laws like the CPSA. 66 In the first stage, the
Drugs,

Food,

and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) of 1938 concentrated
for the regulations that created

on the following:

standards of identity and for the labeling of products; the

burden of proof of product safety; and supervision over

manufacturing practices. 67 In the second stage, many laws
and regulations targeted specific kinds of products or

66
.

(1983)

Michael

R.

Lemov,

Product Safety Commission, at 1.01

.

67
.

Id.

at 1.02.

The burden of proof lies on manufacturers

26

27

issues: flammable fabrics,

68

products containing hazardous

substances like chemicals,

69

children's items,

accidents,

71

suffocation in refrigerators,

72

70

car

the control of

radiation from electronic products 73 and poisonous
products

74
.

In the third stage, product safety has been regulated

under the CPSA, a general legislation, although some
products are still under other laws and regulations. 75

Tobacco is regulated under the FHSA and the Cigarette

Labeling and Advertising Act; motor vehicles, under the
NTMVSA; pesticides, under the FIFRA; aircraft and related
products, under the FAA; boats and vessels, under the

Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971

(FBSA)

food,

;

drugs, and

cosmetics, under the FDCA; products related to the work

place and working condition, under the Occupational Safety

68
It was amended in
Flammable Fabrics Act of 1953 (FFA)
1967 to include whole fabrics and give authority to the Secretary
of Commerce to set standards for f lammability. See Lemov at 1.04.
FTC can ban fabrics worse than standard. See Lemov at 1.05.
69
Federal Hazardous Substances Act of 1960 (FHSA), Federal
FDCA,
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act of 1959 (FIFRA)
See Lemov at 1.05.
and Federal Caustic Posison Act of 1927 (FCPA)
FHSA was amended to give the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW) the power to ban household goods and toys containing
certain chemical substances.
70
See
Child Protection and Toy Safety Act of 1969 (CPTSA)
Lemov at 1.05. It gives the HEW the power to recall or remove
banned substance from children's goods.
71
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
(NTMVSA)
It introduces a special agency called the National
.

.

.

,

.

.

.

.

.

Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
72
Refrigerator Safety Act of 1956 (RSA)
73
Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968
.

.

(RCHSA)
74
.

75
.

Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970 (PPPA)
Lemov, at 4.05, 4.07 note 2 and 3 and 4.08.

.
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and Health Act (OHSA)

;

Atomic Energy Act (AEA)

radioactive products, under the
;

and radiation from electronic

products, under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA)

76

Among the numerous laws and regulations that have been
introduced since the first stage, the CPSA is still a
typical comprehensive regulation scheme, and therefore, the

analysis of the CPSA can be analogous to that of other
special legislation. Meanwhile, the FDCA is not

comprehensive but can be regarded as a general regulatoryscheme on food, drugs and cosmetics, categories that are

very broad in kinds and make up a great portion of the
consumer market. 77

Therefore, the analysis of these

products will also be worthwhile in understanding similar
styles of legislation in the US.
thesis,

In this section of the

the practices of the CPSA and FDCA will be

discussed in reference to the aforementioned five stages.

76

CPSA Section 31.
Howard Abbott, Product Liability, at pp. 23-24 (1978); The
amount of consideration concerning safety is different depending
on products and can broadly be divided into two groups of
products, "products which go into" human and "products which go
onto" human. The former, such as food, cosmetics and drugs, need
"a full scale safety program" because they directly affect the
human body inside, whereas the latter, such as household products,
household appliances, and so-called consumer products do not. The
latter group has exception. Transportation vehicles have a strict
safety program. As a further example, Abbott enumerates
comparisons between meat and an aftershave lotion and shows how
biologically active face cream has more risk than a cream cracker.
Within the same group, the degree of risk varies depending on the
inheritant attribute of products and human activities; for
example, an electric carpentry machine is more dangerous than an
electric cleaning machine.
.

77

.

29
2

.

Risk Assessment Stage

Hazard identification can be achieved by research
before or after the sale of products. 78

Pre- sale research

consists of lab experiments and tests on a sample
population.

The lab experiments test contaminants or

additives of the products, e.g., residual pesticides on

agricultural products and additives in food.

Post -sale

research collects data mainly from the epidemiological
studies that survey the results from the use of products by
actual consumers
The products to be consumed by human bodies, i.e.,
food and drugs, are tested in the laboratory before they go
on the market, and the FDA is responsible for judging the

safety of food and drugs.

The safety of other products is

judged based on voluntary research by the manufacturers.
The risk information obtained through post-sale research,

statistics on injuries during the use of products,

e.g.,

may prompt the safety agencies to start regulating those
products. Transportation vehicles, however, are somewhat

different. The NHTSA requires that some safety tests, such
as of the crashworthiness of cars, be done before the

vehicles are sold to consumers.

78
Research after sale also can be done in the final stage,
the implementation stage. See supra II, B, 3.
.

.

.

.
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The data for risk assessment typically come from four

important sources: 79 expert knowledge, information

accumulated by standardization bodies and regulation
agencies,

accident surveillance schemes or similar plans,

80

and information from consumers such as comparative test

results and consumer complaints. 81

Risk assessment in the labs requires expert
knowledge. 82 The data from lab experiments can be described
in two ways, quantitatively and qualitatively.

The

threshold approach to hazard is a qualitative method,
whereas the linear approach to hazard is quantitative. The

quantitative method, taking into account progress in
scientific methodology, is considered the most important

method in the US. 83

However, neither quantitative nor

qualitative data explain chronic problems or attendant
circumstances, and, as a result, may mislead the decision
84

maker

79

Data for risk management also come from same sources.
The rapid- exchange system of information on dangerous
products in the EC is an example
81
Id. at pp. 33-34. On information from consumers, see infra
at pp. 42-43
82
The US's scientific and technological conclusions are
another expert knowledge which is almost automatically honored in
other countries, especially regarding products containing toxic
chemicals
83
While the US, in most cases, does not use the qualitative
method any more, other developed countries such as Canada and the
UK, in many cases still stress the threshold approach. See Kathryn
Harrison and George Hoberg, Risk, Science and Politics, pp. 171.

80

.

.

.

.

.

173

(1994)
84
.

.

Otway and Peltu, at p

.

6.
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Let us consider some risk assessment practices in the
US,

for example.

As an accident surveillance scheme,

the

famous National Electronic Injury Surveillance System
(NEISS)

has been used in the US since mid-1972, after

unification of the Food Drug Administration (FDA)'s
National Injury Surveillance System and the National

Commission on Product Safety's Hospital Emergency Room
Injury Reporting System. 85

The NEISS supplies information

related to injuries from more than 1,000 product groups,

information on consumers, and related background
information. 86 The information comes from the hospital

emergency rooms. Then the results are extrapolated to the
national average. 87
The surveillance schemes investigate two kinds of
accidents, deaths and injuries from products. The US uses
the Medical Examiner and Coroners Alert System (MECAP) and
the death certificate data base supplied by the CSPC. 88

The

death certificate data base has details on deaths related
to products. 89 In cases of injury,

the US has a data-

collecting system centering on hospital records, which may

OECD 1991, at p. 42, note 14, 15. In the EC, a home
accident surveillance system is the counterpart of the US system.
8b
These product groups are selected as representative.
87
Viscusi, at p. 49.
88
According to the OECD Report, other OECD member countries
than Sweden, Holland, the United States and the United Kingdom
have weak death data on the products and the process of death, or
may not commonly use even weak data.
89
OECD Committee on Consumer Policy, Product Safety:
Developing and Implementing Measures, at p. 10 (1987) [hereinafter,
OECD 1987]
85

.

.

.

.

.

.
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include data from interviews with the victims. In the CPSA,
the Commission maintains the Injury Information

Clearinghouse to gather statistical and epidemiological
information on injury and death as well as economic loss or
health impairment. 90 The National Commission on Product
Safety (NCPS) describes injury and death data not only in
terms of the total number of incidents but also in terms of
the total cost to society.

91

The NCPS's report deals with

sixteen consumer products that, unreasonably, were not
safe.

92

The CSPC's priorities are based on the following: data
on the frequency and severity of injuries; the causes of

injuries and their amenability to policy influences; the

unforeseen nature of the risk; the vulnerability of the
population at risk; the probability of exposure to the
hazard,-

93

and analysis of chronic illnesses,

and costs and benefits.

future injuries

The necessity for safety

regulation should become clear in the preliminary stage of
risk assessment. People select a specific product,

unconsciously or consciously, after comparing quality
including safety features, price and other special
purposes,

such as the speed thrill of a motor cycle. 94

Under a perfect market,
90
.

CPSA Section

5

(a!

Lemov, at 1.09.
Id.

Viscusi, at p
Id.

at p.

1.

.
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individuals' demands on quality,

33

price and special purpose may meet the

manufacturers'

calculation of consumers' demands at the equilibrium. 95
However,

the necessity for intervention by safety agencies

arises if the safety of a product is below the consumers'

demands or the government -recommended standard.

3

.

Risk Management Stage

a.

Survey of Overall Measures and Their Data

1)

Rule Making 96 and Adjudication

Risk management in US government agencies has two
facets: rule making and adjudication.

Rule making means

"the promulgation of generally applicable requirements or

standards governing future conduct," while adjudication

means determination of "the legal consequences of past
events in a particular controversy between specific

parties." 97

95
.

Id.

Therefore, mandatory standards,

at p.

regulations,

2.

The CPSA's procedure has modified that of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and is different depending on
measures; standards and bans follow Section 7-9; disclosure of
information, Section 6; recall, Section 15; rule making on
inspection and record keeping, Section 16. The FHSA and FFA have
their own procedure modifying APA procedure.
97
Stephen G. Breyer and Richard B. Stewart, Administrative
Law and Regulatory Policy, at p. 398-399 (1979) [hereinafter,
Breyer and Stewart think this distinction
Breyer and Stewart]
somewhat absurd because each may share some of the others'
characteristics. On the definition of rule, see Breyer and
Stewart, at p. 407; adjudication here is a remnant of the
definition of rule making as administrative activity.
96

.

.

.
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and statutes are part of rule making; on the other hand,

recalls and cancellations of admission of import are

bans,

part of the adjudication facet of risk management.
The procedures for rule making and adjudication are
different.

Rule making, generally, follows the notice-and-

comment procedure, while adjudication adopts a trial-like

proceeding. The former process requires more commitment of
time and energy than the latter. Their characteristics are

also different. The former, rule making, targets the
future, while adjudication attempts to mend the past. The

scope of judicial review is also different. Rule making

prefers consistency and uniformity to the individuality of

adjudication and is clearer and more publicized. The former

usually allows participation by the interested. Selection
between them as policy measures depends on many
considerations

98

Rule making can be divided into notice-and- comment

rulemaking and on-the-record rulemaking; in other words,
informal rule making and the formal rule making. These

require differing degrees of substantial evidence depending
on the decisions to be made.

Informal rule making is

satisfied with any information or sources of knowledge."

Hybrid rule making, between informal rule making and
formal rule making,

98
.

99
.

10 °.

100

at p. 404
Id. at p. 4 80.
Id. at p. 501
Id.

was created so that it can use
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documents in a hearing procedure. It is a trial style

without the parties' presence, oral testimony, or cross
examination. 101 Hybrid rule making has merits such as the

clarification of goals as well as impact evaluation of a

broad range of alternatives. 102

2)

Specific Measures

The measures utilized by product safety agencies may
be mandatory or voluntary. Voluntary standards and

voluntary rating systems are obviously some examples of
voluntary measures,

103

whereas the mandatory measures may

take the form of mandatory standards -setting such as pre-

market clearance and approval before sale, the hazard-

reporting duty of the manufacturer, certification
requirements, continuous inspection, regulation of the end

products and PPMs, product ban or recall, the blacklisting
of manufacturers who do not meet standards,

shut down a piece of dangerous equipment,

red- tagging to

fines including

criminal charges, injunctions and cease orders to eliminate

This is one of EPA' s rule making methods. See id. at pp.
509-510. In Appalachian Power Co. V. Ruckelshaus, 477 F. 2d.
495 (4th Cir. 1973), certain types of technical issues require
limited cross examination. See, id. p. 511.
101

.

102
.

Id.

at p.

8.

As a voluntary industry rating system for product safety
may work as a tactic to get competitive low-quality product makers
out of competition, regulations are often introduced for the
protection of such companies and out of deference to consumers'
freedom of choice. These voluntary measures will be discussed in
another section.
103

.
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unsafe practices of a manufacturer, and the like. 104

These

measures exist within the statutes or regulations, in part
or in all, under different names,

in different countries.

These mandatory measures may then be classified into

preparatory actions, regulatory actions, corrective
actions, and monitoring actions, depending on the time of

application. 105
The CPSA's risk management techniques include

mandatory standards, bans, recalls, imminent procedures,
penalties and so forth.

The mandatory standards and bans

are issued based on the unreasonable risk involved,

106

while

recalls are based on the existence of substantial hazard. 107
The mandatory standards consist of requirements

"expressed in term of performance" whenever feasible and
the manifestation by warnings or instructions or by any

requirements "reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce an

unreasonable risk of injury associated with such product."
These requirements are identical to the voluntary

104

The range of discretion on the same measure by regulators
is also different depending on countries. The most frequently used
measure against dangerous products in most countries is the ban of
use of the product in question. The second and third are
limitation of the quantity of dangerous substances in products at
issue and labeling or packaging requirements, if a product is
.

indispensable and there are no other practical methods. Both of
these are mandatory standards or certification requirements.
Regarding the ban, each country has a negative substance list
where specific toxic substances are prohibited; however, the range
varies somewhat. See, OECD 1974, at pp. 7-8.
105
OECD 1987, at p. 7 and 26.
106
CPSA Section 7 (a) and 8. Hereinafter, "mandatory
standards" is used with the same meaning as "specification."
107
CPSA Section 15.
.

.

.

.

.

.
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standards' requirements.

108

The CPSC can ban any hazardous

products which do not meet the mandatory standards,

109

or

when the condition is such that "no feasible standards
protect the public from the unreasonable risk," e.g.,

[can]

injury from products. 110
The requirement for a recall is a violation of

existing safety rules or a product defect that creates "a
substantial risk of injury to the consumer."

A recall is

used in order to shorten the time required in making the
standards from more than a year to a mere several weeks. 111 A
recall requires manufacturers to provide notification 112 of

replacement, repairs or refund.
ban,

113

The prerequisites of a

"unreasonable risk" and "appropriateness,

"

have the

possibility of arbitrary interpretation, as do those of a
recall,

e.g.,

"a substantial product hazard," unless they

have clear criteria.
The first action by the CPSC in a ban is to file a

complaint and a motion for an injunction in court so as to
seize the dangerous products.

criminal penalty

108
.

109
110
111

116

113
114

US
116

A civil penalty 115 or

may be imposed on those who violate the

CPSA Section 7 (b)
Viscusi, at p. 42.
CPSA Section 8
Viscusi, at p 63
CPSA Section 15 (c)
CPSA Section 15 (d)
CPSA Section 12 (a)
CPSA section 20.
CPSA section 21.
.

112

114

(1)
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CPSA's provisions, e.g., the manufacturer, the distributor,
the retailer or the importer whose products do not conform
to the safety standards. 117

When the CPSC finds that

imported products, before their entrance into the US
territory, violate safety requirements,

their admission. 118

the CPSC can refuse

Some may argue that this refusal of

admission is a fatal measure to exporters and related
industries,

in contrast with the situation that domestic

industry can repair or notice or replace the products in

violation of the same requirement.

However, because only

the MFN treatment of the GATT, not the national treatment,
is applied before the products'

entry into the country,

such discriminatory treatment of imported products is still
legal under the TBT.

Recalls and voluntary standards are more frequently
issued than mandatory standards. The reasons are not only
that the courts have unfriendly attitudes toward mandatory

standards for fear that the courts as well as the safety

agencies would have to share responsibilities for injuries
or deaths that might happen after they authorize mandatory

standards, but that Congress has also criticized the

practices of making mandatory standards and cut the budgets
of safety agencies for political gain.

119

As a result,

function of making specifications of product safety is

117
.

118
.

119
.

CPSA Section 19.
CPSA section 17.
Lemov at 3.12, note

6

and 3.13, 3-19

the
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nowadays in the hands of private standard makers, and the
safety agencies just monitor their efficiency with such

mandatory measures as recalls or bans. 120

3)

Dangerous Products: General Control or Specific Control

The risk management method for chemical substances and

products may be general control or specific control.
General control decides the safety of finished or end

products using criteria such as the reasonableness,
acceptableness, and substantiality of the risks.

Whether a

product is safe or not is determined through those
criteria.

General control preserves the freedom for

manufacturers to be innovative because they can adopt any
technology to obtain the acceptable level of safety and get
the agency's approval.

The disadvantages in this system

are the possibility of procrastination of approval and the

uncertainty of approval

.

The criteria and the procedures of

approval are normally published beforehand to foreign

manufacturers
Specific control may take the form of publishing which
substances are permitted and, even if substances are
permitted, the maximum quantity of those substances. This
style of control does not deal with final products. The

problem here is that it can sometimes discourage the

120
.

On standards, see supra Chapter II, D,

3
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innovation of the manufacturers. On the other hand,

exporting countries need not worry about the time required
for the approval and the unpredictability of approval as in
the case of general control.

specific control

Moreover,

can be easily harmonized on an international level, while

general control allows various practices in individual

countries over a wide range. 121 Specific control is commonly

used for food, drugs, agricultural products, cosmetics and
pesticides, while general control is used for most

household products. 122

b. Decision on a Measure and its Details

1)

Common Requirements

The criteria for the decision on acceptable risk in
the CPSA's measures 123 are "unreasonable risk" of products

and "substantial risk" of a defect. 124

These criteria bear

on such factors as the pattern of the defect,

the number of

defective products, the severity of risk and the cost and
benefit analysis.

125

As can be seen from these terms,

the

OECD 1974, at pp. 35-36.
Id. at p. 38. On the definition of cosmetics and
household products, see id. at pp. 42-44.
123
Scher 1973, at p. 30.
124
CPSA Section 15
125
Scher 1973, at p. 57. Other laws also have similar terms:
in FDA, "substantial risk," and in OSHA, "significant risk."
121

.

122

.

.

.

.

.

41

bridge between risk assessment and risk management rests on
such vague words as

substantial" and "unreasonable."

Measures under the CPSA should be issued in the public
interest but also to minimize adverse effects on
competition. 126 For this purpose, cost-benefit analysis was

introduced in the 1981 Amendments to the CSPA. This
analysis is vulnerable, however, to the influence of safety
agencies' philosophies, objects and motives. 127

The CPSC prepares the data to describe the potential

benefits and costs of the chosen measures, even those costs
and benefits that cannot be quantified in monetary terms.
For example,

in the case of lead poisoning,

there has been

some criticism that the CPSC simply calculated the costs in

cents per gallon without considering many intangible

factors such as the lead level in children's blood,

the

relation of lead exposure levels to individual health, and
the overall expense of such harmful effects on health.

128

The critics say that the CSPC should have considered

whether the ban on the paint containing lead would give
consumers greater health benefits than total costs.

129

The CPSC is not expected to perform the cost-benefit

analysis as a strict requirement but rather as a flexible

126
.

Id.

OECD 1987, at p. 15. For example, the US is thought to
have more parentalism when drafting regulations than Canada,
focusing on excessive protection of the consumer.
127

.

128

at p.

44

.

Id.

.

Id. Another example is

129

a lawn

mower specification case.

42

mandate. 130 While agencies under the Office of Management and

Budget (OMB) mostly consider and perform cost-benefit

analysis as the most important element in decision,

independent agencies like the CPSC just refer cost-benefit
analysis to unreasonable risk judgment as a supplement. 131

Adjudication must not be used if a standard would
"adequately protect the public from the unreasonable risk
of injury." 132 The requirements in the adjudication process

are judged based on the findings on such issues as the

degree and nature of the risk of injury, the approximate

number of consumer products subject to the rule, and the

indispensability to the public of that particular product.

2)

Participation

One of the most important elements that can bring
about different results in risk management is who

participates in the regulatory process, e.g., consumers,
industries, employees, mass media, etc.

133

Participation by

consumers is one of the most important factors. 134 Consider

130
.

Id.

at p.

43.

The other agencies are strictly supervised

by OMB.
131
.

132
.

133
.

Viscusi,

at p. 44.
Id. at p. 42.
Cummings, at pp. 13 0-136.

Foreign industries 's participation is rare though very
influential. For example, five OECD member countries adopted
statutes on cosmetics safety that introduced a private trade
association to create voluntary standards and provide
surveillance. Among them, only the UK and the US gave foreign
exporters the chance to participate in making regulations. See
134

.

s
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this example. When the FDA announced the proposal of a ban
of saccharin because of its carcinogenicity,

the diabetes

association appealed and mobilized the mass media focusing
on what those with juvenile diabetes and those employed in

related industries would suffer from the ban. This

mobilization was dramatic because people personalized the
possible agonies which would result from the FDA'
decision.

Industries that used saccharin also attacked the

FDA report, which warned of the possibility of cancer if an

average adult consumed 800 cans of diet soda a day, and

appealed that there was no substitute for saccharin. The
frustrated FDA gave up the idea of a ban on saccharin.
In order to prevent undue influence from industries,

the CPSC prohibits its staff and employees from having any

relations with them. 135 For example, they do not have the

voting right to decide voluntary standard proposed by the
private standardization bodies. 136

3)

Decision Cases

An excellent example of the attitude of the product
safety agencies toward scientific evidence can be seen in
the carcinogen standard and the ban on aspartame and

cylamate as food additives. At first, aspartame was

OECD 1973, at p. 42, 53-57.
136
Lemov at 3.11. CPSA Section 4
136
Lemov at 3.11, 3-17, note 8.
.

.

(c]
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petitioned in 1973 to the FDA for sale as an ingredient in
dry foods, powdered beverages and tabletop sweeteners. The
FDA approved it on the condition that a warning be attached
for people who have phenylketonuria. However, before it

went on sale,

formal opposition was publicized that it was

especially harmful to children and pregnant women, possibly
causing brain tumors or mental retardation. The FDA

suspended its use in 1975 for further study and created
Board of Inquiry to review the reports from fifteen safety
studies
The FDA subsequently permitted the use of aspartame in
dry foods with a warning label in 1980, under the condition
that the manufacturers voluntarily monitor the product and

notify the FDA of any possibility of harm. This decision
was made contrary to two scientific reports: one by Richard

Wurtman,

a specialist in

neuroendocrine regulation, and the

other by the Center for Science in the Public Interest,

which warned that it may cause chemical changes in the
brain when combined with carbohydrates.

The FDA also

approved its use in soft drinks and wet foods.

Saccharin and aspartame survived the battle, though
they are regarded as more dangerous than cyclamate among

scientists. Their survival demonstrates that adjuciations

45

are often issued without inconsistence in value judgment on
the scientific report.

137

In 1958 the FDA listed cyclamate,

another artificial

in the Generally Recognized As Safe list

sweetener,

(GRAS

after it analyzed comments of the scientists on

list)

safety questionnaires. The FDA did not perform any tests on
it because there were no indications of harm in the reports

of the scientists.

It was then sold in great amounts in the

wake of the fitness fad. However, subsequent reports of

possible harm as well as the aggressive lobbying and
advertisement of the sugar industry prompted the FDA to
initiate animal experiments. After cancer symptoms were

discovered in the lab animals, the FDA banned cyclamate. 138
In this instance the FDA made its decision following

these negative reports instead of those positive reports
that pointed out that saccharin and other additives in

processed foods were more harmful than cyclamate.

When the

FDA assessed the risk of cyclamate and decided measures and

acceptable risk, it carried out experiments on cyclamate
and did not carry out experiments on its substitute,
saccharin.

139

Many subsequent reports after the ban supported

the relative safety of cyclamate, but whether or not

cyclamate is a carcinogen to human bodies is still

137
In Canada there is no restriction on the sale of
cyclamate, but saccharin was banned, contrary to the decision of
the US. See Cummings, at p. 13 9.
138
Cummings, at pp. 123-127.
.

13

\

Id.

at p.

130.

.
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uncertain. Nonetheless, the public and the beverage

companies now show lukewarm attitudes toward the banned
cyclamate,

14 °

and most beverage companies have discontinued

cyclamate in their products. 141

Whether a substance is a carcinogen is based on
Delaney's zero-risk cancer standard, which states that "no
additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to
induce cancer when ingested by man or by animal."

However,

the Delaney Amendment has been criticized on account of

inaccuracy and inefficiency. The critics argue that

extrapolation from animal experiments to humans can

possibly contain errors, and that the zero-tolerance policy
is unnecessarily rigid and prohibits the possible

significance of other product features and freedom of
142

choice

140

.

Id.

at p.
at p.

.

Id.

at pp.

Id.

141

142

128.
12 9.

133-134
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B.

Safety Standards on Products 143

1.

Regulation and Standard

The regulation makers and the standard makers are

largely different from three perspectives. 144 Firstly, from
an economic prospective,

the former usually overestimates

the benefits and underestimates the costs, while the latter

usually overestimates costs and underestimates benefits.
Secondly,

in the regulatory philosophy perspective,

the

regulation makers have the view that manufacturers should
follow enhanced technological standards. They have a more

paternalistic tendency to protect consumers from harmful
products than the standard makers. The standard makers, on
the other hand,

try to understand industrial situations,

assuming that buyers are clever enough to judge the
products for themselves. Standards are based on the

technology feasible to the industry and are protective of
managerial discretion. They tend to put the practices and
the technical and economical feasibility of industry in the

foremost position, while the regulation makers try to

consider a variety of opinions from participants.

Regulation makers set early deadlines for compliance, while

On examples of product safety standards, see Bass at p
table 5-1.
144
Ross E. Cheit, Seting Safety Standards, at pp. 205-206
143

.

94,

.

(1990)

.

.
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standard makers are careful in the adoption of unproven and
These differences result from the fact

new technology.

that standard makers are concerned about product liability

more often than regulation makers. Such concern dictates
that standard makers avoid addressing issues of consumer

misuse and embracing new technologies. Regulations are

usually made by lawyers, while standards are set by
engineers
Thirdly,

from an evolutionary perspective, while the

standard makers have a prospective view, regulation makers
have a retrospective one. 145

Regulation makers usually

intervene after a crisis, or a major disaster, while
standards are usually set in order to avoid such disasters.
Most countries adopt either or both of them as a risk

management strategy. Nonetheless, the degree of dependence
on either may be different. 146

The CPSC tried to set mandatory standards but was

frustrated by the unfriendly attitudes of courts and the
Congress. As a result,

private standards.

it has occasionally turned to

Meanwhile,

the European Community (EC)

is more dependent on standards than the US. The EC has the

directives on general safety and standards; relevant laws
of the member states are subject to these directives. Most

product safety standards in the EC are made by the private

145
.

Id.

at pp.

17-20.

This different degree may influence on foreign exporters
with different severity of trade pressure.
146

.
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standardization bodies, such as the European Committee for

Standardization (CEN) and the European Committee for
Electro-Technical Standardization (CENLEC)
the developed countries,

147

Contrary to

the developing countries have few

private institutions that are able to get safety standards
due to a lack of money finance and experts. Most

institutions are usually monopolized by their government,
and standards are also rare. Therefore, the voluntariness
of standards is really weak in most developing countries.

2.

Conditions

The CPSC can set mandatory standards under the CPSA if

voluntary standards are not complied with or if the
compliance with such voluntary standards would not

eliminate or adequately reduce the risk of injury. 148

The

issue here is how the CPSC interprets the above conditions,

147

The European Committee for Standardization (CEN) and the
European Committee for Electro-Technical Standardization (CENELEC)
are private associations whose members are the eighteen national
standardization bodies. However, CEN and CENELEC 's drafted
standards are publicized to members of ISO/IEC, which then make
comments on them. The areas not covered by the European
standardization scheme are under national standard -making
organizations. National member organizations, EC Commission, or
industrial federations can initiate the standardization project.
Proposed standards are usually decided by consensus. Then,
national member organizations start to modify the standards.
European standardization usually starts from the initiation of
ISO/IEC, whose representative national member organizations are
Deutsches Institut fur
British Standards Institution (BSD
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and
Normung(DIN)
See GATT, Trade
Association Francaise de Normalisation (AFNOR)
Policy Review: European Communities 1991, at p. 122, 123 and 125
(1991); OECD 1991, at p. 23.
CPSA Section 7 (a)
.

,

,

.

14fl

.

.
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because only the CPSC can determine the existence of one of
those situations as a pre- judiciary decision.
The CPSC's interpretation was in the beginning

favorable toward mandatory standards.

The CPSC's vigorous

attempts to create mandatory standards were, however,

frustrated by the court's denial of the agency's ambitious

regulation scheme and budget reduction by Congress. 149 As a
result,

the CPSC started resorting to recalls and bans. 150

Eventually, the CPSC seems to have concluded that it should

only set comprehensive general safety specifications or

general provisions and entrust the details to private
standards, while monitoring the private standard makers'

activities and regularly performing inspections and surveys
over their operations.

3

.

Characteristics

Despite their voluntariness, a good number of
standards have turned out to be economic mandates against
manufacturers,

sellers,

or distributors, because they

recognize that they will be out of competition unless they
follow those standards. This power of standards is

demonstrated in the showdown between the UL standards and
the CPSC standards on a woodstove. Product liability

.

Lemov, at 3.09.

.

OECD 1991, at p. 12

149
150
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insurance and the local building code require wood stoves
to follow the UL safety standards rather. than CPSC's

specifications. Without the UL marks, the premium is
higher, and the product cannot be used as material for

buildings

151

Furthermore, recent trends see voluntary standards

being more utilized than mandatory standards of government
agencies on the international level. 152 The reason is

attributable to the limited capacity of the safety
agencies.

As a compromise, product safety agencies

prescribe general product safety regulations and laws and
entrust the power to make specific standards to non-

governmental bodies, controlling their compliance with a
ban or a recall. 153

There are three points to consider in judging the
standards.

154

The first is the general nature of products,

their performance or characteristics.

i.e.,

Therefore, a

standard can be either a performance standard or a

characteristic standard.

Compliance with a performance

standard can be judged by a performance attribute test,
such as a flammability test of clothing materials. Most

standards are claimed to be performance standards, but many

151

Cheit, at p. 95.
The other two of three distinctive trends nowadays are
the regionalization of standards and mutual recognition instead of
harmonization. See, OECD 1991, at p. 11.
153
OECD 1991, at p. 12.
lb4
These three considerations are also true of mandatory
standards
.

152

.

.

.
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of these are,

in fact,

characteristic standards because

some performance standards derived from one feasible design
for compliance. The second consideration is the scope and

level of protection intended by the standards. The

standards do not mean only one level of standard for one
product. Depending on different degrees of safety features,

different measures can be taken. The third consideration is
applicability.

It costs less for new products to comply

with strict standards than for existing products. Strict
regulation is therefore rational for new products. The
costs of compliance should be embodied in similar products

with the same ratio as much as possible. 155

4

.

a.

US Practices

Types of Voluntary Standard Makers

According to the National Bureau of Standards, 420
nongovernmental standard organizations compiled 32,000
standards, of which health and safety standards take up the

largest part

.

The private standard makers may be trade

associations, professional societies, general membership

155
.

Viscusi, at pp. 24-26.
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organizations, and third party certifiers. These four

groups regard due process and consensus as very important. 156
The trade associations, such as the American Petroleum
Institute, make few product safety standards. They are

driven by their closed structure and homogeneous members
for their interests. Professional societies and general

membership organizations have more diverse members than the
trade associations, but the general membership

organizations have a broader range of members and are more
related to public safety.

Examples of these are the

Society of Automotive Engineers and the American Society of

Agricultural Engineers; examples of the professional
societies are the American Society for Testing and

Materials (ASTM) and the National Fire Protection

Association (NEPA)

,

which have various members including

competitors. Most standards the general membership

organizations have drafted deal with public safety
including product safety. The general membership

organizations have arranged their budget by means of sales
of their publications and standards. Third party certifiers

test the product in the light of standards and make their

own standards. For example, Underwriters Laboratories (UL)
the National Sanitation Foundation, which certifies

Cheit. at pp. 21-23. Consensus here does not mean the
consensus in Chapter II, D, 1. Consensus here means less than
animosity and more than majority.
156

.

.
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restaurant equipment, and the International Association of

Plumbing and Mechanical Officials are some of examples. 157

b. Their Practices

All private standard makers do not slant toward the

industry's interest. Other organizations than trade

associations are often asked to set standards independently
in order to serve the clients of the trade organizations.

158

The procedure for making private standards is often similar
to that for mandatory standards in terms of such features
as the not ice -and -comment procedure and the guarantee of

interest groups' participation. For example, the Board of

Standards Review, which reviews appeals from the standards
of the ANSI and ASTM,

making standards.

allows consumers to participate in

Some private standard makers insist on

their professionalism and impartiality, and not all

standard makers are controlled by determining industrial
interests. Nonetheless, their efforts still fall short of
those of mandatory standard makers.

159

The private standard makers in most OECD countries

utilize consumer participation. For example, the ANSI has
the Consumer Interest Council to incorporate consumers'

attitudes toward products in their standard-making

157
.

1SB
.

159
.

at pp.
Id. at pp.
Id. at pp.
Id.

23-25.
11-14
14-17
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process. 160 The International Organization of Standards (ISO)

also utilizes consumer participation in a similar way.

c.

Specific Standard Makers

ANSI can be called a coordinator and certifier of
overall national voluntary standards, although it does not

make standards but only approves standards proposed by
other standard makers. 900 standards of ANSI's 8,500

certified standards are under the category of "safety and
health" and consist of procedural and substantive

standards. The members of ANSI are industry representatives
and standard makers including governmental product safety

agencies

161
.

Other important private standard makers are the

American Gas Association (AGA) which approves standards for
gas appliances, and the American Society of Mechanical

Engineers (ASME) whose Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code is

incorporated into law in the US and Canada. 162

Also,

the

ASTM's F-15 Committee has developed product safety
standards for such items as high chairs, cigarette lighters
and bathtub grab bars.

160
.

161
.

163

In local or provincial building

OECD 1991, at p. 35
Id',

at p.

26.

The Supreme Court decided that this code is antiId. at p. 27, note 8.
competitive in 1983.
163
The relation between ASTM and ANSI broke up and the
former no longer files standards for approval to the latter. Id.
162

.

at p.

27.

,
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references have been made to the codes drafted by

codes,

the International Conference of Building Officials
the Southern Building Code Congress International

(ICBO)

(SBCCI)

the Building Officials and Code Administrators

International (BOCA)
Code Officials

,

(CABO).

and the Council of American Building
164

The NEPA's National Electric Code

and Life Safe Code are also frequently referred to by other
165

laws.

Furthermore, the UL has safety standards on

microwave ovens, fire extinguishers, and so forth. 166
If a private company's purchasing power is great due

to its large size,

its standards in purchasing heavily

influence the suppliers of those products. Retailers

generally quote the private safety standards. For example,
Penny,

J.C.

a huge retailer,

incorporates private safety

standards into its purchase orders. 167

Despite domination like the above, local building codes
are still broad depending on the region, the type of construction
and the standards of the insurance industry. In addition, those
building codes usually quote standards drafted by other types of
standard makers. For examples, many UL standards are incorporated
into local building codes. Gas utilities can be installed only
when complying with safety standard of American Gas Association
164

.

(AGA)

.

.

at p.
Id.

.

Id.

.

Id.

Id.

165
166

167

28.

at p.

9.

.

CHAPTER IV
THE ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 2.2 OF THE TBT

A. History

1.

From GATT XX

(b)

to TBT

Before the TBT, the rules of international risk

assessment and risk management of product safety were

provided by GATT. The relevant provisions in GATT
that a GATT member state may issue "measures

.

.

.

provided

necessary

to protect human, animal or plant life or health," unless

those measures are "a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable

discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade" 168
and discriminate against foreign goods outside of a

Contracting Country compared with domestic goods. 169

GATT

also required that those measures "pertaining to
requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports
or affecting their sale, distribution

.

.

.

169
.

170
.

gaTT Article XX body and Article
GATT Article III.
GATT Article X.
57

I

.

insurance, [or]

warehousing inspection" should be published. 170

lee.

.
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Article XX

(b)

is a representative provision on the

national risk assessment and risk management of product
safety,

and this provision has been called the mother

provision of the TBT.

However,

since Article XX

(b)

has

been shown to impose limits on national sovereignty over
health and safety legitimacy, some protectionistic
countries have tried to interpret their sovereignty very

broadly in regards to all areas of the NTBs. 171 This

protectionism has become a wake-up call to the free-trade
believers
Despite the urgent need for an international agreement
on technical barriers, due to diversity and complication it

took twelve years to conclude the NTBs.

172

After the

decision in the Tokyo Round to develop health and safety
regulations,

the TBT was adopted on April 12,

entered into effect on January

1,

1980.

173

1979 and

They decided that

"the only way to remove NTBs was to write new and clearer

rules defining what governments could and could not do with

171

Houtte, at p. 13 0, note 9.
OECD 1991, at pp. 17-18; within the OECD region the
matters on safety regulations and standards make up 5 or 10
percent of all technical barriers. Most of them are related to
electrical appliances. Despite the ratio, they have significant
effects. On difficulty of measuring the effect of NTBs, see
Jackson, at p. 364. Oliver Long thinks that it is almost
impossible to measure. The agreements on NTBs are agreements on
subsidies and countervailing duties, customs valuation,
anti -dumping, import licensing procedures and government
procurement. See, Oliver Long, Law and its Limitations in the GATT
The cost in EC
Multilateral Trade System, at p. 2 5 and 2 8 (19 85)
due to differences in health and safety standards and regulations
amounts to 60 billion dollars annually. See Houtte, at p. 129,
note 4
173
There are thirty-nine member states as of 1990.
.

172

.

.

.
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various non-tariff policy instruments." 174

The TBT embodied

the new enforcement system that has been discussed.

2

.

The Revised TBT on Risk Assessment and Risk Management

Of TBT 175

The revised TBT incorporates new provisions on risk

assessment and risk management into the existing TBT. Its
Preamble states that health and safety measures can be set
This

"at the levels a country considers appropriate."

notion of national discretion in risk management raises the

possibility of a controversy over its meaning.

The second

sentence in Article 2.2 was therefore inserted in order to
address the issue of the relationship between free trade
and national sovereignty: risk assessment and risk

management should be

w
.

.

.

not more trade restrictive than

necessary to fulfil a protection of human health or safety
taking account of risks."

Article 1.5 of the revised TBT transfers to the ASPM
the newly introduced regulation on sanitary and

phytosanitary measures on the products to be consumed by
human bodies. The ASPM is a special Agreement to TBT, which
was proposed during the UR. Under the Negotiating Structure

174
.

25

(1993)

Robert

E.

Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law,

at p

.

The provision on risk assessment and risk management is
Article 1.1 in the previous TBT and in the current TBT, the
Preamble and Article 2.2.
175

.

60

and Plan of the UR prepared by the Group of Negotiations on

Goods (GNG)

the Group of Negotiations on Services

,

and the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC)

(GNS)

set three

negotiable plans in agriculture.
The principle of "'minimizing the adverse effects that

sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and barriers can
have on trade in agriculture," inter alia, was the first
plan.

176

Then,

in the mid- term review of the Trade

Negotiations Committee, the prototype of the ASPM was
drafted. 177

The trade negotiators agreed on four main areas

of agriculture,

one of which was the ASPM. 178

seed dispute" between the US and the EC,

179

Since the "oil

these four areas

were packed into one package which required all or zero

approval

B.

Application

The TBT is mandatorily applied to all GATT member
states, unless they abandon membership of the new GATT

through Article-XXI procedure in GATT. 180

This is a great

departure from the previous TBT, which was only applicable

176
GATT, GATT Activities Annual Review 1987, at p. 126
On the program to harmonize the national
[hereinafter, GATT 1987]
ASPM regulation, see GATT, GATT Activities Annual Review 1988, at
p. 35 and 38 (1988) [hereinafter, GATT 1988]
177
GATT 1988, at p. 138.
178
Hudec, at pp. 183-4, 188; other areas are "market
access," "domestic support" and "export subsidies."
.

;

.

.

179
.

180
.

186.
GATT Article 15.2.
Id.

at p.
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to the members of the TBT itself.

The TBT applies to all

products in international trade except those regulated
sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 181

by-

The technical

regulations and standards in Article 2.2 of TBT are

applicable to both the characteristics and the process and

production methods (PPMs) of the product. 182
standards differently from regulations.

The TBT treats

The standards are

not bound by such requirements as "not more trade

restrictive than necessary to fulfill," the strict
existence of legitimacy, and risk assessment. 183

According to the definition of product safety
regulations and standards in the TBT, judiciary decisions
on product safety are not taken into consideration. 184

However,

in countries like the US, where judiciary

decisions are very influential in the risk management
mechanism,

court decisions on product safety are usually

reflected in the safety regulations.

TBT Article 1.3. On the kinds of products, relevant laws
Eliza Patterson,
and definition, see CPSA Section 3 (a)
Adverse
Trade Effects of
Minimize
the
International Efforts to
National Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations, Journal of World
Trade, Vol. 24 No. 2, at pp. 92-93 (April, 1990).
182
Annex I, Article 1 of TBT. See 30 I.L.M. 1594(1991); the
product safety regulation and standard is one of the technical
regulations and standards. Recently, developing countries have
felt that many safety regulations in developed countries will be
more related to PPMs; for example, in the legislation of the
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) in Tuna Dolphin case. The
introduction of PPMs is likely to create more trade battles.
183
TBT Article 5, Annex 3: Code of Good Practice.
i8i

_

.

.

_

184
.

TBT Annex

1.
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C

.

1.

Requirements

General Requirements

A general requirement throughout the TBT is that the
technical regulations and standards should not be an

unnecessary trade obstacle.

in order to

For example,

prevent regulations from becoming an unnecessary trade
obstacle, a country should discontinue certain regulations

when the circumstances or objectives which prompted them no

longer exist, or when new circumstances or objectives
require less trade restrictive measures. 185

There must be a reasonable time period between the

publication or announcement of a new technical regulation
and its implementation so that other countries can respond
and cope with the change. 186 Countries issuing adjudications

should also notify alleged violators and give them a chance
as is the case in the CPSA.

to respond or explain,

187

The safety agencies of an importing country may

require exporters to disclose certain trade secrets, e.g.,

methods of production. However, if the disclosure of a
trade secret is required in a country where no protection
is guaranteed against other competitors,

185
.

186
_

187
.

TBT Article 2 3
12
TBT Article 2
CPSA Section 15
.

.

.

.

it will discourage

.
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exporters from trading with that country; 188 therefore, such

practice would become a trade obstacle. 189

In some cases,

some developing countries intentionally impose higher

standards than their domestic standards or require

disclosure of technologies in order to acquire advanced
foreign technology from the more advanced exporting
countries
If a regulation gives de facto competitive

disadvantage to an exporter when compared with the domestic
industry in the importing country, it can become an

unnecessary trade obstacle.

Suppose that company X in

England cannot get product liability insurance necessary to
export to the US at a reasonable cost.

It would have a

disadvantage in penetrating the US market because of the
increased cost.

The higher premium on export products

results from the safety standards of the US, whose

technology and practices are different from those of the
exporter.

Moreover, consider the difficulty for exporting

countries in acquiring certifications from private or

governmental safety institutions. Their products may fall
short of the expectations of consumers.

The independent

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the CPSA in the
US protect trade secrets. This can be a touchstone for other
countries. See Lemov, at 3.10, note 9-15.
189
Breyer and Stewart, at p. 1060. In the US under the
trade secrets and commercial
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
information and information not allowed to be disclosed according
to other laws are exemptions to disclosure [5 U.S.C. Section 552
198

.

.

,

(b) (3)

,

(4)]

.
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importers and related entities would worry about

susceptibility to liability to the injured consumers or
even criminal charges. 190

Therefore, the exporters may

de facto, a rejection or stringent requests by the

face,

importers

Then the practices of an importing country that

.

requires higher standards than the exporting country become
a de facto trade obstacle.

The clause that regulations should "not be prepared,

adopted and applied with a view to or with the effect ..."
in the scope covers the entire stages of risk assessment

and risk management for product safety.

191

Then,

during the

entire stages, the activities of safety agencies should not
be an unnecessary obstacle requirement.

2

.

a.

Specific Requirements

Free Trade's Superiority to Safety Legitimacy

The free trade principle appears to have more weight
than safety legitimacy, according to the clause "not more

trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate

objective."

Daniel

E.

Therefore,

it is difficult to apply here

Esty's theory that the US Supreme Court's balance

Abbott, at p. 20. Exporting companies that have exclusive
distribution contracts or equivalent subsidiaries are in a much
more comfortable situation.
1,1
Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT, at pp. 113-130 (1994).
190

.

.

.

:
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test between interstate trade and environmental protection

can be applied to the relation between the international

trade and environmental protection. The environmentalists
in the US would argue that environmental legitimacy is more

important than free trade

b. Necessity 192

The meaning of the clause,

"necessary to fulfil a

legitimate goal," is that regulations should be the last
resort for product safety. 193

Analogous to the Tuna Dolphin

a regulation which does not meet the necessity

cases,

requirement is a violation of the principles in GATT and

Article 2.2 of TBT. 194
The decision in Tuna Dolphin I describes the necessity
of a measure in this way:

"it has exhausted all options

reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection
objectives through measures consistent with the (GATT)." 195
Tuna Dolphin II described necessity in more detail
Contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with
another GATT provision as necessary in terms of Article XX
(d) if an alternative measure which it could reasonably be
expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other
GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in
cases where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions

The interpretation follows cases
Tuna Dolphin II, CAFE and the Gas Guzzler
193
On the same opinion, see Houtte,
thought that "necessary" in GATT XX means
legitimate purpose than restrictive trade
192

.

.

.

BISD 3d (1955), at p. 189 et seq.

.

30

194

195

I.L.M.

1594

(1991)

.

such as Tuna-Dolphin I,
Tax case.
at p. 134; however, he
at least larger
effects.

.
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is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to
use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that
which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other

GATT provisions. 196

This decision illustrates a narrow interpretation of

necessity to maintain the international free trade. It
shows a strict interpretation of the necessity of safety

protection to a degree that the importance of the safety
regulations should "take precedence over the requirements
of free movement of goods." 197

Even though the TBT does not

provide an exact definition of necessity, the
interpretation of GATT Article XX can be applied.

c.

Discretion over Appropriateness

According to the Preamble to the TBT, Article 2.2
allows a member country to decide "the levels it considers

appropriate" on such issues as the degree of the risks to
be protected,

the measures for protection of human safety,

and the nexus between risks and measures.

The decision of

the appropriate level is left up to the national

government.

The vagueness in this provision is one of the

greatest failures of the TBT, since the lack of exact
criteria allows a country to evade international
regulation.

The TBT should provide specific provisions on

what appropriateness means and how to estimate it
196
.

197
.

I.L.M. 839 (1994), note 85.
Houtte, at p. 134, note 24 and 26.
33

.
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d.

Risk Assessment

Article 2.2 explains how to utilize available
scientific and technical information, related processing
technology, and intended end uses of products in assessing

This provision, however, is too broad and leaves

risks.

room for wide differences in its interpretation.
The first problem is determining the availability of

scientific and technical information.

Often the parties in

a dispute must agree on the source of available

information. For example, in the case of Thailand's

restrictions on the importation of cigarettes from the US,

both parties agreed to use the scientific evidence from the
World Health Organization (WHO) as available information. 198
Without such agreement, it is difficult to define
availability.

Moreover,

if safety test reports contradict

each other, which report or theory should be adopted is a

difficult question.

The dispute settlement panel sometimes

decides to set up an expert group for the decision on the

availability and selection of scientific and technological
theories
The second problem is that Article 2.2 does not

sufficiently describe the methodology of risk assessment
and risk management. The TBT should classify the

198
.

GATT,

GATT 1990]

.

GATT Activities 1990, at p

.

59

(1990) [hereinafter,
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differences among the member states in terms of the method
and process of their risk assessment and risk management
and then should decide on a uniform method and its

principles

D.

Special Considerations

1.

Harmonization of Standards or Specifications 199

a.

A Harmonized Safety Standard, 200 ISO 9000 and the

Requirements in Article 2.2

The TBT encourages its member states to use

international standards or relevant parts of them as bases
for their national technical regulations while taking into

consideration their unique national situations. 201
purpose,

For this

the TBT gives an advantage to a party that adopts

international standards by allowing the presumption of no

violation (thus lower burden) in dispute settlement
procedures.

Therefore,

if a country follows the

Specification means mandatory standards. Here,
"standards" may be used as either specification or standard.
200
Houtte, at p. 129, note 3; the justification for
harmonization comes from the experience that differences of
regulations and standards cause a lack of scale economies, high
distribution and production costs, and higher research expense
because goods made in compliance with one country cannot be sold
in other country.
2oi
TBT Article 2.4.
199

.

.

_

.

69

international standards, it does not have to demonstrate
compliance with the requirements in Article 2.2.
The ISO/IEC standards are an example of the

internationally harmonized standards.

The International

Organization of Standards (ISO) was established in 1946 and
sets safety standards,- the International Electro-Technical

Commission (IEC), an affiliation of the ISO, was
established in 1906 and specializes in electronic matters. 202
Some sectors in international trade which use the ISO

standards for quality management standards include the
electronic,

computer,

aerospace,

transportation, and

nuclear engineering industries, and the pharmaceutical and

health care sectors. 203

The ISO has many PPM standards for

regulating product quality management. One of these PPMs is
the famous ISO 9000 series, which includes quality control
in the safety of products as well as in the work place.

The ISO/IEC standards are often incorporated into

national safety standards. Japan, for example, adopted
fifteen additional standards since early 1990 that are

compatible with those of the IEC on household electrical

McGovern, at pp. 55-58; other organizations working on
standardization are the United Nations Economic Commission for
its
Europe (UNECE) in 1947 and the OECD in 1960. Id. at 230;
success in this area is the Agreement concerning the Absorption of
Uniform Conditions of Approval and Reciprocal Recognition of
Approval for Motor Vehicle Equipment and Parts, and the
International Convention on the Harmonization of Frontier Controls
of Goods, which also contains control of compliance with
standards
202

203
.

Brian Rothery, ISO 9000, at pp. 2-3 and 7-11 (1993).

.

.
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goods and, additionally amended 117 existing standards to

conform with IEC requirements. 204
9000 under a different name,

Also,

the US adopted ISO

the ANSI/ASQC Q 900-1 series,

205

which operates as a voluntary standards system.

b.

International Harmonization of Methodologies

Harmonized international standards are described in
general terms of performance standards, and their

interpretations may vary depending on national legal
theories and practices.

Therefore, the differences in

national theories and practices of safety standards cannot
be ignored.

Moreover,

since national standards are more

flexible than international standards in coping with
changes in technology and consumer expectations, their

existence is important even under a harmonized system of
international standards. Considering the impossibility and

undesirability of making universal international safety
standards and regulations for all products, the practice of

"harmonization based on well -equipped information" was

proposed as second best. 206

92
GATT, Trade Policy Review: Japan, at p
approved
the
use
Japan
Japan]
GATT
[hereinafter,
(1992)
additives that are recognized as scientifically safe by
standards
205
John T. Rabbitt, ISO 9000: Global Competitor' s
On ANSI,
Compliance and Certification, at p. 41 (1994)
chapter II D, 3
205
OECD 1991, at pp. 63-64.
204

.

.

.

.

.

,

.

of food

the Codex

Guide to
see supra

.
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Harmonization of methodologies in making regulations
and standards can be applied to fill the gap where uniform

regulations are not desirable.

In trying to reach an

agreement on methodology, the EC proposed a code of good

practices that can regulate any standard organizations.
This code took the practices of the ISO and the Codex as a
model. However,

it was rejected because the majority in the

EC at that time preferred to follow the scheme drafted by
the TBT and ASPM. 207

However,

the ISO/IEC cannot guarantee international

harmonization of safety regulations and standards, despite
the existence of the International Information Network
(ISONET)

208

(COPOLCO)

and the Council Committee on Consumer Policy
209

Therefore,

the Technical Advisory Group (TAG)

in the ISO and the Advisory Committee on Safety (ACOS)

the IEC,

in

and the International Federation for the

Application of standards (IFAN), were organized in order to
assist in drafting the general guidelines for the
standards. 210
In achieving harmonization of national practices,

the

harmonization of classification systems is most important
because differing product -coding systems can become a

GATT, GATT Activities 1989, at p. 122 (1989) [hereinafter,
GATT 1989]; GATT 1990, at p. 121.
208
The ISONET accumulates information on regulations and
standards of member countries.
209
The COPOLCO guarantees participation by consumers in the
ISO's process of making standards.
210
OECD 1991, at pp. 49-50.
207

.

.

.

.
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hindrance when comparing products among countries. 211

For

example, after Canada changed its coding system for certain

products after having used the same classification system
as the US,

it became difficult to compare those products

between the two countries. 212
Also,

the method of calculating the severity of and

expenses for injuries arising out of the use of the product
must be harmonized among countries in order to provide fair

compensation to the injured consumers. Furthermore, all
relevant information and data must be disclosed for

inspection by an international organization.

2

.

Mutual Recognition

The GATT principle of mutual recognition or

equivalency should also apply to the TBT, even though the
TBT does specifically recognize each country's regulations.
This is because some provisions in GATT encourage the

member countries to try to enhance their mutual interest
and the free trade principle. 213

adopts the equivalency principle,

products comply with Country

811
.

212
.

213
.

IV,

C,

1.

A' s

Article

5

of the ASPM also

saying that if some

regulations whose

OECD 1987, at p. 11.
Id. at p. 14.
Long, at p. 11; on a related article,

see supra Chapter

.
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objectives and effects are equivalent to those of Country
B's, A and B should recognize each other's regulations.

However,

214

the US is likely to oppose the above

interpretation.

The US environmentalists have already

argued against the equivalency principle in the ASPM,

declaring that the adoption of the ASPM would undermine the
national sovereignty of the US in regulating the safety of

imported products. 215
The interpretation of key words such as "equivalent,
similar,

and identical" is problematic, since these terms

can mean different things to different countries.

To

prevent conflicts at least among EC states, the EC
clarifies "mutual recognition" in that "products which are

legally produced or marketed in at least one

[EC]

member

state are entitled to free circulation throughout the EC

irrespective of their origin." 216

The Non-EC countries could

have mutual recognition agreements with the EC or with each
or must pass through the standardization body within

other,

the EC,

which is called "a notified body" or "accredited

registrar." 217

ASPM Article 5.
John J. Barcelo III, Product Standards to Protect the
Local Environment, 27 Cornell Int'l L.J. 755, at pp. 758-760
214

.

215

.

(1990)

.

Trade Policy Review: European Communities 1991, at
GATT EC 1991]; the EC prefers this
method to others
216

.

p.

GATT,

(1991) [hereinafter,

121

217
.

Id.

at p.

125.
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After recognizing the importance of acknowledging
third party certificates, the EC established the EN 45000
series to qualify testing labs and registers. The third

party agencies examine compliance with ISO 9000 and give or
refuse a passing mark. 218

3

.

Local Regulations and Specifications 219

The central government of a member state has the duty
of ensuring that its local governments and non- government

bodies comply with Article 2.2 of the TBT. 220

The preemption

theory has been utilized in the US in the pursuit of the

uniformity of risk assessment and risk management. For
example,

in the CPSA no state or political subdivision of

the state can make any regulation or retain already made

regulations whenever there are CPSA standards in effect,
unless local regulations are the same as or higher than the

requirements under federal standards. 221

The CPSA sometimes

respects the regulations and standards of the state or

political subdivisions of states if they provide higher

protection for consumers and do not put undue burden on
interstate commerce.

In determining whether they are

21B

Rabbitt, at p. 33 and 35.
The EC is regarded as the central government and other
countries are the local government according to the TBT. See
McGovern, at p. 236.
220
TBT Article 3.1 and 4-5.
221
CPSA Section 26 (a), (b)
.

219

.

.

.

.

.
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unduly burdensome, data on technical and economic
feasibility are considered. 222
The application of the preemption theory varies among

regulations.

For example,

in contrast with the above

example of the CPSA, preemption in the FHSA applies only to
labeling,

leaving the rest to the control of state laws and

regulations. 223 If regulations of the local government or
non- government body adopt higher standards than those of
the federal government,

countries. 224

it is not necessary to notify other

Therefore, higher standards set by the local

governments will make it difficult for foreign industries
to recognize and to follow those standards. 225

For instance,

California has higher standards for automobile emission
control and the cigarette ignition resistance of

upholstery.

New York also has tougher regulation standards

for building materials, which require the fire toxicity of
all materials to be inspected.

These non-uniform higher

standards are burdensome to exporting countries. 226

222
.

223
224

225
226

CPSA Section 26 (c)
Scher 1973, at p. 82.
TBT Article 3. 2. OECD 1991, at p
CPSA Section 26 (c)
OECD 1991, at p. 27.
.

.

27
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4

.

Regulations or Standards in and toward Developing

Countries

The idea of special treatment and technical assistance
for developing countries has been deeply rooted in the GATT

system since the Tokyo Round.

Article XVIII speaks of

"governmental assistance to economic development," 227 and

Articles XXXVI and XXXVII give special status to developing
countries under the non-reciprocity principle. 228 This

preferential treatment of developing countries is also
embodied in the TBT and the ASPM 229 in the form of technical
assistance and technology transfer. 230

However,

there are

not yet comprehensive norms in this area, and such

provisions will not be effective without imposing certain
legal duties on the developed countries

Moreover, most national safety regulations or

standards do not have special treatment clauses for

developing countries.

The developed countries should take

into consideration the developing countries'

situations

when making safety regulations and standards.

They should

also try to tolerate developing countries' regulations or

standards

227

Long, at pp. 89-94
McGovern, at p. 2 73.
229
On the origin of the special treatment,
pp. 271-272.
23 °.
Article 11.2,3, 12.1-3, 7, 8.
.

.

228

.

.

see McGovern at
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5.

Disputes

A violation of Article 2.2 of the TBT resulting in an
"injury" can be brought before the Dispute Settlement Body
of the GATT.

(DSB)

231

A violation of the previously existing

safety regulations, if it also violates Article 2.2 of the
TBT,

may also be brought before the DSB. 232

Under the TBT, the individual victims of a safety
regulation violation cannot bring an action against another
government in a domestic court or the DSB of the GATT,

233

while the injured individual companies or other legal

entities in EC Directive may do so. 234

Central governments

as well as local governments can petition,

according to

Article XXIII, after consultation and negotiation.

Depending on national legislation, a foreign company may be
allowed to file a petition.

The CPSA provides that the

petitions are to be filed in a specified US court of
appeals or to the CPSC. 235
The burden of proof of an Article 2.2 violation is on
the country whose safety regulations are claimed to have

been violated. 236

However,

if the regulations or the

GATT XXIII and Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
232
TBT Article 15 2
231

.

.

.

.

Houtte, at pp. 129-130.
EC Single European Act Article 30-36, 69, 170. Article
170 is for the regional commission's right to petition.
235
CPSA Section 11(a) and 10.
236
McGovern, at p. 22 9.
233

.

234

.

.

.
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standards in question are in line with internationally

harmonized standards, the burden of proof will then be
transferred to the country that has allegedly violated the
regulations at issue.
The issues in the disputes mostly arise out of

differences in interpretation of the TBT provisions.

Take

one such example. Korean food sanitation regulations have

been attacked by the US since 1990.
shelf life of processed foods. 237

One issue has been the

The US representatives

claim 180 days on shelf is safe, while the Korean

representatives claim less than 30 days is safe.

This

dispute has been under negotiation before the dispute panel
of the GATT.

237
GATT 199 0, at p. 121; Korea Herald, MOTIE Min. Park
embarks on U.S. tour for trade talk, February 11, 1995, p. 8
.

CHAPTER V

EVALUATION

A. Evaluation of the TBT

1.

The Evaluation Standard, the New Approach of the EC

The European Community (EC)

is more politically and

economically, homogeneous than the TBT or GATT, and its

members are historically and socially more interrelated
with one another than the members of GATT.

Because of

similar cultures and common backgrounds, EC organizations
have operated more harmoniously than those of any other

international communities. Although the TBT or GATT cannot
be expected to duplicate the EC experience, we may gain

insights from the EC's systematic approach to risk

assessment and risk management.
The EC's legal provisions are similar to those of
GATT.

Each member country has the right to set its own

health and safety regulations or standards. 238

To solve the

problem of varying safety standards and regulations among
the member states, Articles 30 and 36 of the European Union

EU Treaty Article 36.
79

-

80
(EU)

Treaty provided that health and safety regulations and

standards should not have the effect of quantitative
restriction, arbitrary discrimination, disguised
restriction, or hindrance, direct or indirect, to intra

community trade. 239

Also,

according to the Court of Justice,

safety regulations and standards should satisfy the

necessity requirement of human health and safety. 240

This

requirement of necessity has broader meaning than in GATT. 241
The EC has tried three approaches to deal with the

differing safety standards and regulations among member
countries. 242 The first approach is called the "New

Approach." 243 Under the New Approach, the Council Directives

prescribe essential requirements which are then
supplemented by the national product safety agencies'

voluntary standards. The second approach is the traditional
approach,

in which the Council Directive itself provides

detailed standards for harmonization.

The EC at first used

the traditional approach to all products, until the Court
of Justice in Cassiss de Dijon case strongly endorsed

national sovereignty based on the principle of safety
legitimacy.

Consequently, the EC adopted the New Approach

in the EEC Council Resolution on Technical Harmonization of

239

Houtte, at p. 132, note 17.
Id. note 19.
241
Jackson, at p. 414.
242
OECD 1991, at pp. 40-42.
The New Approach was named for the EEC Council Resolution
on the Technical Harmonization of Standards in 1985. See id. at p.
.

240

40.

.

81

Standards in 1985. 244 The third approach takes national
standards and regulations as the primary text for product
standards, and the EC is simply notified of these as the

reference for the other member countries. 245

2

.

The Characteristics of the New Approach

The New Approach is a systematic start to solving the

problem of different safety regulations and standards among
countries.

Above all, the recent General Product Safety

Directive is a comprehensive and relatively detailed

program246 that can be a guide to the revised TBT.
Therefore, a look at the characteristics of the New

Approach may be helpful
The New Approach is initiated only when national

product safety requirements conflict with those of other

member countries and impede free trade. 247

If a product

coming into the EC is classified as a "regulated product,"

related to health, safety, and environmental protection, it
should meet the European standard, the EN 29000 standard,

which is a voluntary standard identical to the ISO 9000

244

at p. 40.
GATT, Trade Policy Review: European Communities vol. 1,
at p. 121 (1991) [hereinafter, GATT EC 1991]
246
Directive 92/59/EEC, 29/6/92, OJ No L 228, 11/9/92, pp.
24-32; Margaret L. Moses, Europe's New Product Safety Rule, 132
N.J. L.J. 1191, at p. 11 and 29 (Dec. 28, 1992).
247
GATT EC 1991, at p. 122.
.

Id.

245

.

.

.

.
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standard. 248

Therefore, exporters who plan to market their

products in the EC should get a certification of EN 29000
standard compliance in advance.
The following private organizations set the EN

standards: the CEN for non-electrical product standards,
the CENELEC for electrical product standards, and the ETSI

for telecommunication standards. These standards are

derived from the details of the Directives on the product
safety, and they have already been approved by the EC. 249

Since the New Approach is to become effective in the
future,

the Council Directives of 1991 have not yet gone

into effect, even though they have already been approved. 250

Therefore, the detailed standards under the traditional

approach are still in force as long as the Directives
following the traditional approach are effective.
As long as the EC has set harmonized standards for a

product, national regulations of a member state on that

product cannot take effect, unless that member state

notifies the Commission of its plan to make the regulation
in advance.

The Commission then decides whether a member

state needs to have separate health and safety regulations

different from the harmonized EC standards and whether

248
Rabbitt, at p. 36; children's toys, the computer
terminals and food Packaging are examples. Rabbitt, at pp. 31-33;
one hot issue is software for operating systems because, if it has
a defect, it may cause the human injury or death during operation.
249
GATT EC 1991, at p. 123.
.

.

250
.

Id.
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those standards are reasonable.

However, even the

regulations endorsed by the Commission may be subject to
annulment by the Court of Justice. 251
Furthermore, any private individual can challenge,
a national court,

in

a national regulation or standard of a

member country which violates EU Treaty Articles 30-36. The
national court then requests the Court of Justice to make a

preliminary ruling on whether the regulation at issue
violates the Treaty and the Directives.

The national court

then predicates its own decision on the decision of the

Court of Justice. The EC Commission and member countries
can also request the Court of Justice to declare a member

state's national regulation a violation of the Treaty. 252
Finally,

it should also be noted that a defendent

whose products are certified under the ISO standard or the
EC standard has an advantage in defending a product

liability lawsuit because his products are presumed to have
been produced under a defect- free production process and
are therefore safe. 253

251
.

252
.

253

EU Treaty Article 100A 100B, and 100
EU Treaty Article 169 and 170.
Rabbitt, at pp. 35-3 6.
,

84
3

.

The TBT in Terms of the General Product Safety

Directive 254

As in the EC's General Product Safety Directive,

the

>

TBT should contain more details on risk assessment and risk
management,

such as the harmonized methodologies infra

and clear definitions of general terms. 256

25S

For example,

while the TBT does not provide a definition of safety, the
EC Directive has full definitions which are helpful in

hazard identification and risk characterization. 257

The EC

Directive also clearly defines the producer and
distributors,

258

which reduces the conflicts surrounding the

interpretation of those words.

Further,

the TBT should

clearly enumerate such considerations as characteristics of
products,

technical feasibility, and so on that are

necessary in risk assessment. 259
Risk assessment and risk management in the EC are
triggered by a violation by manufacturers of either a

A general duty is the

general duty or a specific duty.

duty of due care, and a specific duty may be the duty to
supply safe products, the duty to provide all necessary
After a two-year transition period, this Directive became
effective on June 29, 1994 [hereinafter, Directive]
255
Of course, because the Directive is part of the New
Approach plan, the features of the New Approach are true of this
Directive
256
Directive Article 2.
257
Directive Article 2 (b)
258
(e)
Directive Article 2 (d)
254

.

.

.

.

.

,

.

259
.

Id.

.
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information, or the duty to take all possible measures. 260

Each EC member state is responsible for adopting and

implementing suitable measures for risk management within
that state, and for setting up competent safety agencies
for rule making and adjudication.

It is internationally

important that these domestic duties ensure exportation of
safe products. 261

The TBT should also guarantee the protection of

information filed with the TBT Committee and safety
agencies because disclosure of information can be an

unnecessary trade obstacle, as explained earlier.

Also,

the TBT should describe available measures for risk

management.

While allowing the member countries to take

appropriate measures, the EC Directive describes what is
appropriate in the following specific measures: the
competent monitoring system, the request for all necessary
information, the inspection of samples or production

processes,

the efficient warning system,

for all possible persons,

risk communication

sale permission after the

absolute safety check, recall and destruction, and

emergency standards. 262 Although these measures may differ
among countries, the conditions and effects of as many

measures or groups of measures as possible need to be

harmonized to avert conflicts.

260
_

261
.

262
.

Directive Article
Directive Article
Directive Article

3.
5.

6.
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The relationship between harmonized standards and

national standards should be clearly described in order to

facilitate mutual recognition. In the EC Directive, if
there is no EC regulation, national regulations or

standards are to be complied with.

If there are no

national mandatory or voluntary standards, the EC standards
or the standards of other member countries may be used for

recognition of a safe product. The EC Directive also
recognizes standards of a non-member country if they are

acknowledged by a member country. 263

4

.

The TBT in terms of National Practices

The Code of Practice of the TBT should include general

principles regarding the collection methods and the kind of
data required for hazard identification. The decision on
the necessity and priority of risk management plays an

important part in product safety and must be predicated on

hazard identification and whether product safety agencies
have regulated the safety of a product.
however,

In reality,

even developed countries like the US and several

OECD countries have often decided to regulate products only

263
.

Directive Article

4
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on the basis of such meager information as a medical

report

264
.

Uniform product classifications should be established
in the TBT to enable the TBT Committee to compare the risk

assessment and risk management of member countries.

Differences in product classification systems have been an
obstacle in judging whether the risk assessment and risk

management of a country are an unnecessary trade barrier
compared with those of other countries. 265 The need for a

uniform classification system is analogous to the need for
a uniform tariff schedule.

The data on risk assessment and risk management should
be described in a consistent manner in order for the

Committee to understand them. 266

The data should be

described in a mathematical, statistical statement as much
as possible,

since a mathematical,

statistical statement

can help clarify the cost and probability of accidents and
the severity of injuries. 267

Relative numbers instead of

absolute numbers, e.g., ratio, weight, and rank, should be

employed because absolute numbers will always differ among
countries and mean different things.

For example,

264
OECD 1987, at pp. 12-14; the OECD once recommended a
uniform system with identifiable groups of injuries and priorities
among them as the minimum element in the Report on Data Collecting
System in 1978. However, this recommendation is not yet achieved
by member countries.
.

265
.

p.

12

Id.

at p.

11.

.

This new approach has been worked out in OECD. See id. at

.

Id.

266
.

267

at p.

13

.
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compensation for the loss of a human life is different in
each country depending on the economic and political

situation as well as the society's view on the worth of a
human life.

The US legal system is peculiar in its

practice of awarding punitive damages, though it is similar
to European civil law countries in other aspects like

compensation of hospital expense and loss of income.
However, because priorities among conflicting values,

the

probability and severity of injuries, and relative values
are very similar among countries, the data on risk

assessment should be described in relative numbers in order
to compare practices more accurately.

B.

Evaluation of the US Product Safety Regulation and

Standard Systems

1.

General Criticism of US Practices 268

The product safety laws and regulations in the US lack

coherence in comparison to the systematic organization in
the EC's New Approach.

The same key words in different

statutes have different meanings, and value judgments are

often inconsistent depending on the responsible agencies
and organizations and the time of the decision. For

Bureau of National Affairs, Safety and Liability
Reporter, at p. 175 (1995) [hereinafter, BNA 1995]
266

.

.
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example, OSHA's interpretation of the key term

"unreasonable risk" is more sympathetic toward the industry
than the CPSA's interpretation of the same term. 269

The US imposes adjudication measures for simple

procedural violations more frequently than the EC. 270 For
instance,

the CPSC often heavily penalizes manufacturers

who fail to comply with procedural provisions that are

irrelevant to the general duty of product safety required
by the CPSA. It may deny importation of certain products
for not having kept appropriate records,

or for failing to

file a proper notification.
Further,

a skeptical attitude toward technology and

scientific discovery in the judicial and administrative
bodies discourages a foreign company with state-of-art

technology from entering the US market. They often confer

unreasonably strict liability decisions on the new
technology without giving it due credit.

This attitude is

clearly evidenced in product liability cases where

astronomical amounts of punitive damages are often imposed
on the producers of products whose safety has not yet been

proven.
269
.

271

Id.

at p.

180.

270

Frances E. Zollers, Sandra N. Hud and Peter Shears,
Product Safety in the United States and the European Communi ties:
A Comparative Approach, 17 Md J. Int'l Law & Trade 177, at pp. 8-9
.

(1993)

.

Murray Mackay, Liability, Safety, and Innovation in the
Automotive Industry in Peer W. Huber and Robert E. Li tan eds
Liability Maze, at p. 210 (1991); on court system, see Id. at pp.
200-202. /Another example is the adjustable seat belt anchorage in
the 1980s. European companies worried about possible suits based
271

.
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For these reasons,

some new technologies that have

huge advantages in fiercely competitive markets like Japan
or the EC are not introduced in the US until later.
radar- controlled proximity braking system,

A

for example, has

not been introduced in cars heading for the US because

European and Japanese manufacturers worried about possible
liability suits for design defects and about NHTSA
adjudications.

In a case involving one such advanced

technology, the Audi automobile company was sued for the

safety of Audi 5000

's

unintended acceleration system.

Although this new technology had no technical problems in
the NHTSA report,

the relentless blast by the media and

massive litigations by consumers, both of which are salient
cultural features in the US, caused serious financial

trouble for Audi. 272

2.

Criticism on Risk Management in the US: Centering on

Decision Making

The US system also has a few risk -management

problems. 273

First of all, there are few specialists and

engineers participating in risk assessment and risk
inadequate warnings, lack of possibly
astronomical punitive damage awards; see Id. at p. 214. On the
child seat belt, see id. at p. 217. Even though the imported
product follows safety regulations and standards, the court does
not guarantee the winning of the suit. That is, no preemption is
applied to the adoption of the safety feature.
on the defective design,

272

at pp. 210-211.
at pp. 203-205 and 207.

.

Id.

.

Cheit,

273

.

.
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management. Most participants are lawyers with little

technical knowledge or comprehension of the subject matter.
As a result, many provisions of the regulations

unnecessarily emphasize meticulous procedural issues
In addition, public regulations are not usually

revised in accordance with a change of situation. 274 Even

when the current technology reveals a safety problem in a
certain product, or when new tests show conflicting
results, necessary changes in the safety measures are often

delayed by the saturated bureaucracy and complicated

procedures

275
.

Furthermore,

the US takes account of only its own

technical level. For instance, the NHTSA established the
standards for automobile crashworthiness,

276

FMVSS 100s and

reflecting US manufacturing practices. 277 In drafting

200s,

the recent FMVSS 214 standard,

the side-impact standard,

they again considered only whether that standard was

technologically and economically feasible in the US and
ignored any international feasibility. 278
three important weaknesses are

As for the CPSC,

apparent in regards to acceptable risk and appropriate

274

Id.

.

275

Id.

.

276

at pp.
at pp.

203-204
2 04

.

.

The NHTSA has been operating since 196 8.
277
These standards technologically require manufacturers to
enhance their ability. They influence those who target the US car
market such as EC and Japan. These standards have so changed the
concepts of manufacturers that passing the test of those standards
has become one of most primary goals
278
Mackay, at pp. 202-206.
.

.

.
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measures. First, its regulation uses very general and broad

raising the possibility of arbitrary-

terms,

interpretations. Second, it often insufficiently considers
the trade-off between the cost and the benefit of complying

with the regulations.

Third,

it concentrates too little on

the rule making process and too much on aspects of the

adjudication process such as the ban and the recall,
perhaps in an attempt to elude attacks from the court on
the formal rule making procedure. 279 In the matchbook

standard,

for instance,

the CPSC failed to establish the

necessity of regulation. It did not adequately analyze the
accident generation process, accident patterns or accident
statistics; it failed to consider available measures and

alternatives and to compare exact costs and benefits. 280

In

another case involving a gas- fired space heater, the CPSC
made the false assumption that a price increase of five
percent would not affect consumer demand, and randomly

calculated possible reduction in injury without exact
data. 281

279

Viscusi, at p. ix-x.
Mackay, at p. 92; in making the matchbook standard, the
CPSC did not pay attention to other elements capable of lighting a
fire
.

280

.

281
.

Id.

at p.

98.
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Criticism of US Practices of Making Standards

The US private standard makers have been criticized
for being too heavily influenced by industry groups and not

ensuring participation by all interest groups.

This

criticism may not be entirely correct but has some merit
For example, when the UL issued safety standards for the

solid-fuel-type room heater, it consulted with the stove

manufacturers and trade associations but not consumer
groups. The UL 1482 standard,

the codification of the

generally accepted business practices among relevant
industries at that time, received support from the
industry. 282

Only afterwards did the UL pursue a canvass

process for the obvious purpose of gaining consensus of the
Board of Standards Review under the ANSI and elicit
comments from parties interested in developing
standards.

283

woodstove

When standard makers rely too heavily on

industry groups, they tend to base their decisions on shaky
theories or information supplied by the manufacturers, who
have an obvious interest in one direction or another.

The

performance clauses of US 1482, for example, are criticized
for being founded not on scientific theories but rather on

guesswork, despite the claim that it was based on "sound

On this example, see Cheit, at pp. 94-102.
ANSI does not have a technical staff and information
collection system. It relies on the voluntary cooperation of
standard writers. See Cheit at p. 98.
282

.

283

.
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engineering principles, research, records of tests and
field experience

.

.

.

and information obtained from

manufacturers, users and others having special experience

including educated guesses and concessions to the

praticalities of product testing." 284

284
Cheit, at pp. 102-104; the specific example of such
guesswork is the temperature of the exposed surface.
.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Since the TBT is applicable to all GATT member states,
it will often be used in deciding whether certain national

safety regulations or standards are unnecessarily traderestrictive. It is doubtful, however, that Article 2.2 will
be very helpful because it allows very broad discretion of

individual countries over the methodology of risk

assessment and risk management. The TBT should be amended
to include exclusive provisions on product safety

because

the Code of Good Practice in the Annex of the TBT provides

meager guidance. Detailed agreements as to the definitions
of certain terms like general duty,

availability of safety

measures, and methodologies of safety regulations, etc.,
are necessary.

The new provisions should focus on

methodological issues because the harmonization of
methodologies, along with the mutual recognition of
methodologies,

is one of the best ways to resolve conflicts

arising out of different safety regimes.

Harmonization of product classification systems in
each country is the most important element in this
endeavor.

Harmonized classification systems will make it

95

.
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easier to compare and evaluate national safety regulations

under Article 2.2, and therefore the TBT Committee's

harmonization efforts should start with classification
systems
Also,

rules of participation in the decision-making

process should be established in detail.

Especially, the

TBT should ensure that consumers are allowed to participate
in the process of determining regulations and standards.

Consumers choose products to maximize their satisfaction
and are well aware of acceptable risks.

Moreover,

since

their tastes and needs are becoming more internationally

homogeneous and product information is more readily
available than ever, their views on product safety are

assimilated enough to create similar safety standards for
the product. Open communication regarding product risks

should also be encouraged between consumers and the product
risk sources. Furthermore, foreign industry representatives

should also participate in making national safety

regulations and standards. They should participate before
the standardization decisions are made.

The US risk assessment and risk management system

should make certain changes. Instead of using

manufacturers
yardstick,

'

s

current manufacturing practices as their

the regulatory agencies and private standard

makers should utilize more input by other interested groups
than the manufacturers. Current use of adjudication should

97

be more coherent throughout the various safety agencies and

legal sources.

.

.
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